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[FN8]
University of Pittsburgh Law Review
Summer, 2004
Article
*763 THE NATURE OF REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW
Sungjoon Cho [FNa1]
Copyright (c) 2004 University of Pittsburgh Law Review; Sungjoon Cho
Introduction
On August 30, 2002, the World Trade Organization (WTO) [FN1] authorized the European Communities (EC) to suspend its tariff concessions and
other obligations toward the United States to the extent of U.S. $4 billion for the latter's failure to comply with the Appellate Body's decision that the
United States had violated the WTO rules, in particular, the WTO Subsidy Code [FN2] by providing the
prohibited subsidies to foreign sales corporations
(FSCs) in the form of tax breaks (the FSC Article
22.6 Report). [FN3] The sheer scale of the EC's suspension in response to the U.S. violation is unprecedented, far surpassing the suspensions authorized in
two previous cases that invoked the WTO enforcement mechanism, Banana III [FN4] and Hormones.
[FN5] [FN6] At first glance, this dramatic finale for
such a high-profile case might be welcomed as an impressive revelation of the real achievement of the
WTO system equipped with teeth, unlike its predecessor the old GATT. [FN7] No member, even the
powerful United States, can simply walk away from
the legal consequences of its violations, now being
forced to pay the price. The victim of those violations, which is the EC in this case, would be vindicated and satisfied by *765 this bounty or remedy. In
sum, justice and the rule of law in the field of international trade would now seem to be upheld. Indeed, it
will not be surprising if such decisions by the Appellate Body encourage activists of all kinds to attempt
to link various issues to WTO sanctions “[l]ike the
bright light that attracts insects on a warm night . . . .”

On second thought, however, this instance of
sanctions, retaliation or economic vengeance appears
to be a source of problems, rather than a solution.
Despite the popular acceptance that sanctions are an
icon of the new WTO system, sanctions are just an
aspect of the law of the WTO, [FN9] not its representative or symbolic manifestation. Overemphasizing
this particular aspect of the WTO law, which is partly
attributable to an effort to placate the U.S. Congress
into the ratification of the Uruguay Round, [FN10]
tends to create a misguided, distorted image of the
WTO, one close to a super body reigning and commandeering over its member countries, rather than
one akin to a legal community. Critically, in terms of
remedies, a domestic analogy based on corrective
justice or vengeance cannot but retain serious limitations in the international dimension in which a variety of interests are entangled in a complex way.
These limitations seem to be more palpable when
considering to whom the above-mentioned remedies
are directed. Do they serve the general interests of the
victim, i.e., the EC itself in the above-mentioned FSC
Article 22.6 Report? Or, more narrowly, do they
serve the well-being of certain groups of people within the EC who actually lobbied the EC to champion
their grievances before the WTO panel? Do these different vectors of interests always converge? This
series of questions tends to raise a more fundamental
query on the raison d'etre of the WTO system,
namely for what purpose the WTO exists.
Against this backdrop, this paper questions the
conventional belief regarding the efficacy of the
WTO sanctions in light of remedies and attempts to
reconceptualize the true nature of WTO remedies.
Part I examines how the concept of remedies has
evolved through the history of the old GATT 1947
and the new WTO system. It demonstrates that the
private law (contracts) *766 nature of remedies embedded in the early GATT practices has been transformed to public law nature in the subsequent jurisprudence as well as the new WTO system. Part II surveys the various functions and modalities of the current WTO system, such as cessation, compensation,
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restitution and sanctions, and argues that a remedial
hierarchy exists among them, with cessation being
prioritized. Part III then discusses the limitations of
WTO remedies: first, the perils and paradoxes of
sanctions, i.e., eventual manifestation of developmental disparity, mercantilist regression and wrong
cases; second, the welfare loss and distributive injustice. Based on these problems raised, Part IV finally attempts to reconceptualize the nature of WTO
remedies, focusing on “norm-building” as a communal remedy and also exploring the possibility of a
“connection” between WTO remedies and domestic
remedies.
I. The Concept of Remedies Under the GATT/WTO
System
1-1. Prototype
The remedial prototype under GATT 1947 Article XXIII is deeply associated with the origin and
nature of GATT 1947 itself. GATT 1947, patterned
after the inter-war U.S. bilateral trade agreements,
was mainly a reciprocal tariff reduction mechanism.
[FN11] Therefore, this pact among “contracting
parties” purported to cherish and preserve the delicate
balance of tariff concessions by means of legal obligations such as Articles II and III for tariff binding and
national treatment, respectively. [FN12] In this regard, violations of these legal obligations were considered serious not because they were violations but
because a subtle balance of tariff concessions would
be destroyed. This destruction of balance, for instance through an introduction of new trade barriers,
was in turn deemed to nullify or impair the benefits
of certain contracting parties whose exports unexpectedly declined due to these barriers. Therefore, the
original format of remedies under GATT 1947 was
*767 intended to “restore” the delicate balance of interests that contracting parties had labored to establish through a series of tariff reduction negotiations.
[FN13]
Mirroring this strong reciprocal foundation of
GATT 1947, Article XXIII provided the requirement
of “nullification or impairment of benefits,” which is
close to the concept of injury in the law of contracts.
[FN14] In early years, panels spent as much interpretive energy on this element as they did on the determ-

ination of consistency of the questioned measure with
the GATT law. For instance, in 1958, the United
Kingdom sued Italy before the GATT 1947 panel,
complaining that an Italian statute (Law No. 949)
providing special credit facilities only to purchasers
of domestically produced tractors violated the GATT
and “impaired the benefits which should accrue to the
United Kingdom under the Agreement” by decreasing the imports of UK tractors. [FN15] The panel bifurcated its reasoning in parts III and IV entitled:
“Alleged inconsistency of the effects of the provisions of the Italian Law with the provisions of paragraph 4 of Article III” and “Alleged nullification or
impairment of benefits accruing to the United Kingdom under the General Agreement.” [FN16] After
implying that the Italian measures violated Article III
(National Treatment) of the GATT, the panel turned
to a lengthy, detailed interpretation as to “whether the
operation of Law No. 949 had caused injury to
United Kingdom commercial interests, and whether
such an injury represented an impairment of the benefits accruing to the United Kingdom under the
General Agreement.” [FN17] Finally, the panel recommended that Italy should eliminate the “adverse
effects” that the operation of Law No. 949 had
brought to the UK. [FN18]
In addition, the contractual nature of GATT 1947
attached a great importance to the original expectations of the contracting parties regarding the value of
tariffs on specific products. Accordingly, the framers
of GATT 1947 were circumspect enough to provide
unusual remedies for situations in which *768 those
expectations were somehow later denied even
without any violation of the WTO rules, i.e.,
“non-violation” claims. [FN19] For example, in
1950, a GATT working party examined whether Australia had failed to comply with GATT by suddenly
removing sodium nitrate from the pool of nitrogenous
fertilizers that it had subsidized. [FN20] The working
party concluded that such removal, although not violating GATT, did nullify or impair the benefits accruing to Chile under tariff concessions granted by Australia to Chile on sodium nitrate in 1947, because
Chile could have “reason to assume” that the subsidy
on sodium nitrate would remain effective. [FN21]
Likewise, in Sardines, the panel found that the Nor-
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wegian government could have reasonably assumed
during tariff negotiations that preparations of the type
of clupeoid in which they were interested would be
no less favorably treated than other preparations of
the same family. [FN22] The panel then ruled that the
subsequent German modification of this situation
“substantially reduced the value of the concessions
obtained by Norway” and that Norway therefore
“suffered an impairment of a benefit accruing to it
under the General Agreement.” [FN23]
However, the above-mentioned concept of remedies under GATT 1947 should be distinguished
from a more secular use of “trade remedies” in the
domestic context. To deal with the so-called “unfair”
trade practices such as anti-dumping and subsidies by
other trading partners, most GATT 1947 contracting
parties retained domestic statutes, i.e., anti-dumping
or anti-subsidies law, which could remedy unfair foreign practices through imposing anti-dumping or
countervailing duties. [FN24] GATT Article VI also
legalized these trade remedy laws subject to certain
requirements. [FN25] Subsequently, Tokyo Round
Codes and the WTO side agreements further elaborated various procedural requirements for invoking
these domestic trade remedy laws. [FN26] *769
While the remedies in the context of GATT 1947
through the concept of nullification or impairment
under Article XXIII were to protect the benefits of
the contracting parties in general, these trade remedies in the form of additional tariffs often served to
protect the vested interests of certain industries in the
territory of the contracting parties. [FN27] Yet, when
these trade remedies were misused or abused, failing
to meet certain requirements established in GATT
Article VI and other Codes, the contracting parties
could invoke Article XXIII to re-remedy these violations.
1-2. Evolution
The evolution and success of the GATT dispute
settlement system changed the general contour of
remedies. First of all, as the dramatic reduction of tariffs across most products diluted the GATT identity
as a tariff reduction mechanism, the nature of remedies was no longer preoccupied with safeguarding the
delicate balance of tariff concessions. Rather, nontariff barriers (NTBs) became more problematic to

international trade than conventional tariffs because
domestic regulations tended to be complicated, reflecting the ever-growing modern regulatory demand
in areas such as human health and the environment,
and thus burdensome to trade. [FN28] Together with
this focal change, the GATT dispute settlement
mechanism itself was subject to transformation. More
cases were brought before the dispute settlement panel, and naturally the GATT jurisprudence was enriched and developed. [FN29] *770 Gradually, the
GATT came to look like a more sophisticated legal
system, rather than a mere intergovernmental pact.
[FN30] As the former Director of the WTO Appellate
Body Secretariat Debra Steger aptly described, the
GATT slowly turned into “something greater than a
contract that could be withdrawn from by any contracting party whenever it found the obligations too
onerous.” [FN31] Consequently, the global trading
community began to be more interested in preserving
such a legal system, which turned the nature of remedies into compliance with the system that would basically require the withdrawal of violations, but not
necessarily the rebalancing of tariff concessions to
undo the injuries, i.e., nullification or impairment.
[FN32]
In fact, cracks in the concept of “nullification or
impairment” had already begun to appear quite early.
In the sixties, the Uruguayan Recourse Panel ruled
that in cases where measures violate the GATT provisions, they would, prima facie, constitute a case of
nullification or impairment. [FN33] In interpreting
GATT Article XXIII, this ruling focused on the violation itself rather than its effect (nullification or
impairment) in that it shifted the burden of proving
the existence of nullification or impairment from the
complainant to the defendant. In other words, the
panel created a presumption of the existence of nullification or impairment in case of violations of the
GATT provisions. This ruling was later codified in
the Annex to 1979 Dispute Settlement Understanding. [FN34] Then, the Superfund panel made this injury requirement, i.e., nullification or impairment, literally meaningless in the violation claims *771 by
first observing that the operation of the presumption
had been in practice “irrefutable” and then ruling that
even very insignificant trade effect arising from the
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violation could not substantiate the absence of nullification or impairment: the violation would ipso facto
constitute a nullification or impairment. [FN35]
The above-mentioned jurisprudential development under GATT 1947, which highlighted the
concept of violations and thus the withdrawal of them
as remedies, has finally been crystallized in the new
WTO system. For instance, DSU Article 21.5
provides a legal ground for a “compliance panel”
which is convened to resolve disputes on
“disagreement as to the existence or consistency with
a covered agreement of measures taken to comply
with the recommendations and rulings . . . .” [FN36]
Furthermore, Article 22 upholds the remedial priority
of the removal of violations by expressly stating that
other modalities of remedies, such as compensation,
are only temporary and never preferred over the removal of violations and conformity with the WTO
rules. [FN37] Such clear-cut language eloquently indicates that the WTO system prioritizes, in terms of
remedies, consistency and conformity with the WTO
rules over compensation whose concept is deeply associated with such elements as injury, damages and
nullification or impairment. [FN38]
II. Modalities and Functions of the WTO Remedies
2-1. Varying Modalities and Functions
Cessation
In the domain of public international law,
“cessation and non-repetition” is generally considered a foremost remedy for an internationally
wrongful act. [FN39] This form of remedy also exists
under the WTO system, namely the *772 withdrawal
of the questioned measure to conform to the WTO
rules. [FN40] The technical formula for this mode of
remedy that panels or the Appellate Body render on
the basis of their general terms of reference is to determine whether the questioned measure is inconsistent with the WTO law, and, if so, to recommend such
measure to be brought to conformity to the WTO
law. [FN41] Such determination of the violation and
the recommendation of conformity, as combined, can
be said to signify the withdrawal of the questioned
measure. [FN42] In this regard, cessation has a dual
function in the WTO system. First, by halting the

questioned measure, it resolves the dispute as well as
remedies the situation in which a complaining party
has suffered. Second, by bringing the questioned
measure to consistency with the WTO law, it eventually contributes to realizing the objective and purpose
that the WTO pursues, such as trade liberalization
and sustainable development. [FN43] Yet, it often becomes controversial whether a losing party has really
remedied the violative situation, i.e., whether it has
truly withdrawn its measure that was condemned as a
violation or it has merely window-dressed the measure while still keeping the violative effect alive. To
address this subsequent dispute, DSU Article 21.5
provides the so-called “compliance panel” procedure
in *773 which the original panel determines whether
the original remedy it has rendered, i.e., the withdrawal of the questioned measure, has been fulfilled
by the losing party. [FN44]
Another important question related to cessation
concerns whether a losing party should withdraw or
change its domestic statute that caused the violation.
The answer to the question basically rests on the
nature of the measure in question. First, a complaining party can target a certain domestic statute itself as
a violation, under which situation the complaining
party needs to show that the statute is so dispositive
and mandatory that the violation results without executive intervention beyond mere mechanical application. Then, a panel's or the Appellate Body's ruling
would directly affect the destiny of the statute since it
would address the statute as such or on its face. For
instance, the Non-Rubber Footwear panel held that
the automatic backdating provisions of § 331 of the
U.S. Trade Act of 1974 and § 104(b) of the 1979
Trade Agreements Act are mandatory legislation that
cannot be modified by the executive. [FN45]
On the other hand, a complaining party can aim
to challenge a certain pattern of application or implementation of a given domestic statute, not the statute
itself. If the complaining party prevails under such
circumstances, a panel or the Appellate Body would
recommend the losing party only to modify its practice or application of the statute without the need to
change or repeal the statute itself. Notably, the new
WTO dispute settlement system has begun to seriously engage in these “as applied” cases which had
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not been so spotlighted under the old GATT 1947
system. In particular, when interpreting the
“chapeau,” which is the preambular language of
GATT Article XX, [FN46] the Appellate Body has
established a new hermeneutics that scrutinizes
whether a Member has applied its own legislation in
such a way that it does not amount to an arbitrary or
unjustifiable discrimination, to wit in good faith,
*774 instead of reviewing whether a Member's domestic statute itself is necessary or relating to
achievement of its own regulatory objectives.
For instance, the Appellate Body in the ShrimpTurtle case eloquently manifested this application-oriented chapeau test. After rejecting the panel's approach, which had bypassed the interpretation of Article XX(g) and dealt directly with the chapeau instead, the Appellate Body criticized the panel for its
obsession with the “design of the measure itself,” and
its consequent failure to examine specifically how the
application of § 609 constitutes “a means of arbitrary
or unjustifiable discrimination” in addressing the
chapeau. [FN47] It then drew attention to flaws in the
actual application by the United States of its own §
609, such as the fact that the United States had never
seriously attempted to negotiate a cooperative agreement with the four complainants while “multilateral
procedures” such as the Inter-American Convention
for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles
were “available and feasible.” [FN48] Critically,
however, despite losing its case, the United States
was not recommended to repeal or amend § 609 itself, but only its application. [FN49]
In sum, this application-oriented hermeneutics
has a constructive implication with respect to the
WTO remedies. This new hermeneutics tends to encourage offending parties to respect the WTO rules in
a nuanced and subtle way without unduly undermining their margin of discretion or further sovereignty
because the hermeneutics ultimately leaves a domestic statute intact, only suspending its effect to the extent that it would be applied in a violative direction.
Compensation
Compensation is the most liberal form of remedies that aims to achieve a “mutually acceptable”
[FN50] settlement based on the principle of “full and

fair address.” [FN51] Compensation as a form of
remedy usually denotes a pecuniary *775 concept,
which is close to damages. [FN52] However, if compensation were to be calculated as a fixed amount of
money, the injury itself need be pre-determined and
quantified, which is not an easy task in the field of international trade law. [FN53] Even the complaining
parties themselves do not put forward the amount or
the extent of injury that the accused parties have inflicted on them when they initially file their complaints before the WTO panel. Rather, the complaining parties mostly request the repeal or withdrawal of
disputed measures which they argue violated the
WTO law. Therefore, compensation as a remedy
tends to follow these initial wishes of the complaining parties. Hence, compensation is in a nonpecuniary format. [FN54]
Often, it has been disputed whether compensation
in the WTO system should be offered bilaterally or
multilaterally. Considering the voluntary [FN55]
nature of compensation in the adversarial context of
the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, one might
argue that compensation should remain bilateral.
DSU Article 22.2 also provides for the term
“mutually acceptable compensation.” [FN56]
However, as Joost Pauwelyn correctly pointed out,
DSU Article 22.1 also provides that compensation
“shall be consistent with the covered agreements,”
which include GATT 1994 Article I (MFN obligation). [FN57] This provision purports to temper the
bilateral ethos inherent in the settlement for compensation in order to prevent a situation where two parties
concerned would create in the name of compensation
new illegal trade barriers which might harm third
parties, and thus, yet another dispute could ensue in
the future. In this regard, when parties notify the
WTO of the fact that they agreed on a mutually acceptable compensation, they usually include in such
*776 notification a clause offering the same treatment
in the compensation agreement to any other member.
[FN58]
Restitution (Retrospective Remedy)
Under public international law, restitution has
long been recognized as a retrospective form of reparation. The Permanent Court of International
Justice, in its celebrated Chorzow Factory decision,
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held that:
B) The essential principle contained in the
actual notion of an illegal act-a principle
which seems to be established by international
practice and in particular by the decisions of
arbitral tribunals-is that reparation must, as far
as possible, wipe-out all the consequences of
the illegal act and re-establish the situation
which would, in all probability, have existed if
that act had not been committed.
[FN59]
Likewise, under the WTO system
one can also conceive a retrospective remedy
which is close to restitution in the public international law sense, [FN60] if the amount of injury resulting from such violation can easily be
quantified or monetized. For instance, in cases
of anti-dumping or subsidies, those duties imposed illegally can be calculated without difficulty and reimbursed, though those duties may
represent only a part of the injury that the afflicted parties have suffered as a result of
breach of the law of anti-dumping or subsidies.
Furthermore, the nature of anti-dumping or
countervailing duties that target and victimize
specific industries also tends to make such retrospective remedies (reimbursement of duties)
plausible in terms of undoing the injuries inflicted on specific industries. In fact, there
have been some decisions recommending retrospective remedies in the GATT/WTO jurisprudence. [FN61]
*777 Nonetheless, these retrospective remedies
have been regarded as the exception rather than the
norm mainly because the framers of both the GATT
1947 and the WTO prioritized in text the withdrawal
of the violative measures, which is prospective in
nature, over other forms of remedies. Even such exceptions, i.e., a very small number of panel decisions
recommending retrospective remedies, arouse substantial controversy. [FN62] This consistently negative attitude toward the retrospective remedies seems
to be continued under the WTO system. [FN63] For
instance, a recent compliance panel under DSU Article 21.5 surprisingly held that under the WTO Subsidy Code, to withdraw the violation, i.e., the prohibited subsidy, may include a retrospective remedy, i.e.,

repayment of the prohibited subsidy. [FN64] Although this panel report was adopted without an appeal, it was harshly criticized by most member countries, which demonstrates the members' reluctance in
accepting retrospective remedies. [FN65]
Sanctions
The remedy of last resort under the DSU is the
“suspension of the concessions,” which is basically a
self-enforcing mechanism based on the authorization
from the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB). [FN66]
This mechanism, often referred to as sanctions or retaliation, has been regarded as an icon of the new
WTO system in that such teeth provide an operable
threat deterring future violations not only by the losing party but also by other members that witnessed
the sanctions. In fact, this enforcement mechanism is
not new: the old GATT 1947 also provided for it.
[FN67] However, under the old system, the *778 enforcement mechanism was almost inoperable mainly
because the losing party could veto the adoption of
the very panel report that condemned its breach. In
other words, the losing party could deactivate the
whole dispute settlement process and effectively save
itself from even a remote possibility of sanctions.
This critical flaw was eventually rectified under the
new DSU in which a panel or the Appellate Body report was required to be adopted almost automatically
under the principle of negative consensus, which has
resultantly smoothed the way for any enforcement
procedure in the subsequent stage. [FN68]
One of the most controversial issues regarding
sanctions is their appropriate level or scale. [FN69]
To one camp that still holds a contractual understanding on the nature of the WTO and thus views the
function of remedies as a restoration of the balance of
reciprocity that WTO obligations represent, the
quantity of sanctions must be proportional to actual
trade loss, i.e., the extent of nullification or impairment, which complaints may have suffered due to a
questioned measure. [FN70] However, to another
camp that regards the WTO sanctions basically as a
compliance-inducing mechanism, a punitive sanction
may be imposed, exceeding any proportional level.
[FN71] In fact, the latter position appeared in the recent FSC Article 22.6 Report. At the final stage of
the FSC saga, the United States challenged the EU's
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request for authorization of a $4 billion sanction
against it under DSU Article 22.6. [FN72] Surprisingly, the Arbitrators rejected the United States' argument that this amount was disproportionate to the
EU's trade loss caused by its violations [FN73] and
sided with the EC in terms of the amount of sanction.
[FN74]
To buttress their conclusion, the Arbitrators heavily relied on the premise that not only WTO sanctions
but also general countermeasures in public international law should compel violators to comply with
rules, i.e., to withdraw their violative measures.
[FN75] In this regard the Arbitrators viewed that the
appropriateness of sanctions in this case should not
be unduly limited by the volume of actual trade injury considering the “gravity of the initial wrongful
act and the objective of securing the withdrawal of a
prohibited *779 export subsidy . . . .” [FN76] To further underpin their punitive perspective in this case,
the Arbitrators focused on the gravity of violation by
the United States: Its prohibited export subsidies are
a more severe form of violation than “actionable”
subsidies which can be sustained if only adverse effects caused by those subsidies are neutralized.
[FN77] Moreover, the Arbitrators distanced its reasoning from the outreach of DSU Article 22.4, which
explicitly requires a quantitative benchmark, i.e., the
level of a sanction being “equivalent to the level of
the nullification or impairment,” by pointing out that
such language is absent in the WTO Subsidy Code
that is a lex specialis to the DSU in terms of dispute
settlement procedures. [FN78]
However, this Arbitral ruling seems to go too far
despite its understandable premise. Although the
primary purpose of countermeasures is to induce
compliance with rules by violators, a certain cap in
the scale should nonetheless exist in light of equity or
fairness. One cannot find a rationale of the U.S. style
punitive damages either in the WTO or in public international law in general. On the contrary, the recent
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States prepared by
the ILC manifestly stipulate the proportionality requirement even taking into account the gravity of
wrongful acts. [FN79] Without such minimum discipline, sanctions risk being abused or misused,
thereby making them illegitimate and unsustainable.

Another controversial issue regarding sanctions
lies in the procedural sequence towards their materialization under the DSU. To actually enforce sanctions against the losing party, an authorization by the
DSB is required under the DSU. Yet the road to such
authorization is not so smooth. First, the existence of
non-compliance with the original decision, and
second, the level of sanctions, i.e., the extent of concessions to be suspended, need be determined. Because these two issues are often controversial, the
DSU provides a certain mechanism in which those
disputes can be addressed. Article 21.5 provides that:
“Where there is disagreement as to the existence or
consistency with a covered agreement of measures
taken to comply with the recommendations and rulings such dispute shall be decided through recourse
to these dispute settlement procedures, including
wherever possible resort to the original panel.”
[FN80] Then, Article 22.6 provides that: “However,
if the *780 Member concerned objects to the level of
suspension proposed, . . . the matter shall be referred
to arbitration.” [FN81]
However, in light of the sequence between Articles 21.5 and 22.6, the DSU regrettably leaves a certain degree of ambiguity. When a dispute on compliance unfolded in the aftermath of Banana III for the
first time under the WTO system, the winning party
(the United States) requested the DSB “to authorize
suspension of the application to the European Communities (EC) and its member States of tariff concessions and related obligations under GATT 1994 covering trade in an amount of U.S. $520 million” after
unilaterally determining that the losing party (the EC)
failed to implement what the Appellate Body originally ruled in Banana III. [FN82] The EC objected to
this interpretation, arguing that the original panel
should have an authority to decide whether the losing
party has implemented the Appellate Body decision.
[FN83] The arbitration panel, contrary to the EC's position, ruled that in determining whether the level of
suspension is equivalent to the level of nullification
or impairment under Article 22.7, the panel, as a
“logical way forward,” should in advance determine
whether the EC's revised regime, which it had established as an implementation of the original Banana
III decision, violated the WTO rules. [FN84] Despite
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this case law, the subsequent jurisprudence demonstrates that complainants rely on compliance panels
under Article 21.5 to first address disputes on compliance with the original panel/Appellate Body recommendations, rather than directly turning to Article
22.6 to seek authorization of suspension of concessions. [FN85] Considering the rationale of the DSU,
which aims to prevent Members' unilateral *781 determination as to the consistency with the WTO rules
of any measure, as can be seen in Article 23, the latter approach seems more desirable. [FN86]
2-2. Remedial Hierarchy
Having examined various forms and functions of
remedies under the WTO dispute settlement system,
a critical question arises: Does the WTO give the losing party a choice between cessation, i.e., withdrawal
of the violative measure, and mere compensation
without such performance?
In general, with respect to the state responsibility
under public international law, Christine Gray submitted that:
The determination of the consequences of
a breach of international law is left initially to
the discretion of the injured state; there are
many examples of claims completely out of
proportion with the injury suffered being met
and also of similar breaches of international
law being followed by different means and
amounts of reparation. [FN87]
According
to her position, the winning party should
choose what kind of remedies it will eventually accept. However, on this issue Judith
Bello seems to place herself starkly opposite to
this position. Grounded mainly on the omnipotent concept of “sovereignty,” she argues that
compliance with the WTO law is “elective”
from the standpoint of the losing party. [FN88]
Bello argues that the losing party can choose
among withdrawal of violations, provision of
compensation or being subject to retaliation.
[FN89] She also seems to rationalize her argument by trivializing the legal value of the
WTO treaty. She argues that the WTO rules,
like the GATT rules, are “simply not ‘binding’
in the traditional sense” because “the WTO

has no jailhouse, no bail bondsmen, no blue
helmets, no truncheons or tear gas.” [FN90]
She viewed the WTO as a “confederation of
sovereign national governments” relying upon
“voluntary compliance.” [FN91]
*782 However, she gravely misunderstood the
nature of international law in general and blatantly
ignored its essential distinction from domestic law.
An analogy to domestic law cannot help but have inherent limitations simply because international law
lacks a centralized political authority such as the
World Government or the World Congress which
might have rendered to international law something
similar to federal marshals. Yet having those apparatuses is a subsidiary, not a primary element of law.
[FN92] It would be to almost deny the rationale of international law itself to stick to such an ancillary aspect of law in the context of international law. Furthermore, Bello also committed a serious mistake in
equating the old GATT rules with the new WTO
rules boasting a myriad of innovations and transformations, which have reinforced the normative force of
the WTO system. [FN93]
In a reply to Bello's thesis, Professor John Jackson elucidated why there exists a hierarchy among
the different WTO remedies. [FN94] Professor Jackson showed that the DSU “clearly establishes a preference for an obligation to perform the recommendation” based on the black letter law stipulated in the
DSU, such as a panel or the Appellate Body's basic
duty of recommendation of bringing any violative
measure into conformity with the WTO rules (DSU
Article 19), the temporary nature of compensation as
a remedy (DSU Articles 3.7, 22.1), and continuing
surveillance until performance has occurred (DSU
Article 22.8). [FN95] Although it is regrettable that
such surveillance has been in reluctance and even eclipsed by bilateral settlements, this unsatisfactory record does not alter the hierarchy of remedies established under the WTO system. Markedly, this remedial hierarchy is also found in the terrain of public
international law. Draft Articles on Responsibility of
States by the International Law Commission (ILC)
emphasized that a State in breach of international law
continues to bear a duty to perform the obligation that
it breached, [FN96] and that any “countermeasure,”
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i.e., sanctions, should be aimed to *783 induce compliance, i.e., the resumption of performance of the
obligations in question by a violating State. [FN97]
More recently, however, Alan O. Sykes reached
the same conclusion as Bello, yet from a totally different perspective. Grounded on the “law and economics” approach whose mantra is that “the law
should always be efficient,” [FN98] he argued that
paying damages in the form of compensation or suspension of concessions is “an option for WTO Members” and that it is “both understandable and desirable” “as a matter of economic logic.” [FN99] First,
he offered a reading of DSU provisions which is opposite to that of Professor Jackson, turning the DSU
into a “Holmesian ‘perform or pay’ system.”
[FN100] Then, he brought to the fore a bold analogy
of the “choice between damages and specific performance in the law of private contracts,” [FN101]
and applied such analogy to the WTO setting based
on the premise that the WTO is a “multiparty contract” from the standpoint of the “positive political
theory.” [FN102]
Despite the novelty and freshness of his approach, Sykes misunderstood the real identity of the
WTO system. His analogy to a private contract,
which might have made more sense under the old
GATT 1947, can at most have very little application
under the WTO, considering its new telos under its
charter. In other words, the WTO is no more a mere
contract among the contracting parties, but an independent international organization established by its
members in order to envisage an integrated legal system for international trade. [FN103] Under such legal
system, the concept of “efficient breach” [FN104] is
non sequitur. Aptly, he attempted to justify his position by using an example of politically combustible
case, i.e., Hormones, [FN105] contending that:
“Thus, if we suppose arguendo that allowing Europe
to maintain its hormone beef regulation is politically
efficient because the benefits in Europe are great and
*784 the costs abroad smaller, only a breach of the
agreement can enable this efficient adjustment to occur.” [FN106]
Yet again he seemed to be too preoccupied with
the economic test which cannot claim but limited sig-

nificance in the WTO system. The cost of a breach of
WTO rules exceeds a narrow, short-term commercial
calculation. Negative effects undermining the legal
system itself reach many sectors and spread over a
long period of time: such breach is never efficient in
the long-term. Admittedly, political hot potatoes such
as Hormones and Bananas III, which may be dubbed
“wrong cases,” [FN107] should be kept away from
the WTO dispute settlement mechanism to protect its
judicial integrity. However, this could only be
achieved by an ex ante prevention of disputes
through intergovernmental and/or transgovernmental
cooperation-cum-deliberation, not by an ex post
breach of rules. Even if all these efforts fail and the
WTO rules should necessarily give in, a waiver
would be a better option than a flat breach. [FN108]
III. The Limitation of WTO Remedies
3-1. Perils and Paradoxes of Sanctions
Admittedly, sanctions may play a certain role in
inducing compliance with the WTO rules through the
deterrence of similar violations in the future, [FN109]
beyond a narrower remedial role of penalties or satisfaction. In this regard, it may be understandable that a
number of scholars have recently proposed to bolster
the enforcement mechanism in various ways as a
vehicle *785 for strengthening the rule of WTO law.
[FN110] However, aside from the impracticability of
such proposals stemming from the extreme difficulty
of amending the current treaty text, in particular the
DSU, they still raise a more fundamental question as
to whether the sanctions themselves really work.
[FN111]
Sanctions often run counter to what they exactly
attempt to achieve. They envisage power imbalances
between the rich and the poor in the international
arena in the vacuum of law. In addition, while they
may contribute to inducing compliance by the losing
party or to restoring justice, sanctions simultaneously
hurt the inflictor's own people and economy. Furthermore, they nurture political resentment and eventually foment political debacle.
First, by privatizing sanctions and thus leaving
the power of retaliation in the hands of the winning
party, the WTO deprives itself of the rule of law and
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instead invites the rule of the jungle in international
power politics. Without an aura of law, relationships
among trading nations are vulnerable to economic
and political disparities. Therefore, even if a poor
country manages to obtain an authorization to retaliate against a rich country, the effectiveness of such
retaliation cannot help but be limited, considering the
huge discrepancy between the two in their economic
sizes. [FN112] Confronting this developmental dilemma, one might be tempted to attribute it to an incomplete sanction mechanism that is unworkable for
the developing countries. [FN113] However, the dilemma results not necessarily because the current
WTO enforcement mechanism is biased against the
developing countries but because the concept of sanctions itself creates disadvantages to them. In this context, the Banana III arbitration panel, which addressed Ecuador's request *786 for authorization of
suspension of concessions under DSU Article 22.6,
pointedly observed that:
We have made extensive remarks above
on the suspension of obligations under the
TRIPS Agreement and in particular concerning the legal and practical difficulties arising
in this context. Given the difficulties and the
specific circumstances of this case which involves a developing country Member, it could
be that Ecuador may find itself in a situation
where it is not realistic or possible for it to implement the suspension authorized by the DSB
for the full amount of the level of nullification
and impairment estimated by us in all of the
sectors and/or under all agreements mentioned
above combined. The present text of the DSU
does not offer a solution for such an eventuality. [FN114]
Furthermore, even if such
sanction is effective arguendo, the small, poor
country should also take into account any negative political implication in the future that the
sanction may bring vis-a-vis the targeted big,
rich country. Certainly, the small, poor country
would not want to sacrifice much bigger potential economic benefits for such a one-time
Pyrrhic victory. For instance, even in a heated
row with the EU on the banana issue, Ecuador
had to eventually opt for a negotiation, not a

full legal battle, because it acknowledged the
price it would have paid by taking the latter
route. [FN115] On the contrary, the big, rich
country could wield a fatal blow to the small,
poor country by a mere threat of such sanction
because the latter desperately relies on the
market access to the former.
Second, sanctions or retaliation under the DSU
take the form of “suspension” of concessions or other
obligations. Accordingly, sanctions usually end up
raising tariffs or non-tariff barriers to the detriment of
the losing party's market access, which is nothing but
a mercantilist regression. [FN116] As Steve
Charnovitz posited, international institutions do not
generally contradict their own raison d'etre in the
name of sanctions. [FN117] Charnovitz *787
trenchantly observed that “the World Health Organization does not authorize one party to spread viruses to
another. The World Intellectual Property Organization does not fight piracy with piracy. So the WTO's
use of trade restrictions to promote freer trade is
bizarre.” [FN118]
Although such revival of trade restrictions may
appeal to specific domestic industries that compete
with foreign producers affected by the sanctions, the
rest of the domestic economy, in particular consumers and manufacturers, who prefer cheaper imports, would suffer. [FN119] In other words, the
sanctions result in the decrease of general welfare
while only contributing to the increase of special
rents to a narrow group of people. [FN120] This grim
picture may be understandable considering the reality
of the political economy in international trade. In
fact, every WTO dispute is adjudicated only when a
government champions a domestic industry's grievance against a foreign competitor. Nonetheless, this
welfare-reducing outcome of sanctions and an embedded protectionism fly directly in the face of free
trade which the WTO pursues. [FN121]
Third, sanctions or other enforcement measures
under the DSU is, most of all, designed to induce
compliance mainly through threat. [FN122] Yet such
*788 threat does not simply work when the political
cost of compliance is too high. As Oran Young
trenchantly observed, even states who respect the au-
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thoritativeness of a treaty and its specific behavioral
prescriptions frequently find it advantageous to violate them in practice. [FN123] Under such circumstances, according to Joel Trachtman, states tend to
have the “level of compliance that they want”
[FN124] and therefore “the nirvana of perfect compliance is a chimera.” [FN125] In other words, in
high-profile cases, which are deep-rooted in political
complexities [FN126] and thus potential headliners, it
tends to be harder for the losing party to stomach the
rule of law against it. [FN127] Furthermore, in a
political sense the very notion of being enforced or
retaliated tends to make it even harder for the losing
party to reach any settlement because any concession
from the losing party would appear to be a give-in.

is inherently a “negative” obligation. In other words,
a member could bring its discriminatory tax measures
into conformity with the WTO law even by making
domestic taxpayers suffer more than before, as long
as the scale of domestic and foreign treatment is balanced. Of course, a more ideal way of compliance
would be to lower a tax rate applied to foreign producers, rather than to raise a tax rate applied to domestic
producers. Yet, such choice, albeit seemingly ideal,
cannot be forced because the underlying obligation,
i.e., non-discrimination or national treatment, does
not obligate a Member to go that far. To bind the
Member to do so would require yet another substantive obligation which is a “positive one,” such as
“harmonization.”

Nonetheless, once this high-profile case, which
Professor Hudec coined a “wrong case,” [FN128] is
filed and adjudicated before the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, like toothpaste out of a tube, there
is no going-back. [FN129] The case tends to be spotlighted and its political stakes escalated. Third parties
would love to witness real retaliation in this case, regarding it as a litmus test of the effectiveness of the
WTO dispute settlement system. These circumstances provide a fertile ground for a political stalemate, getting rid of stages for the political theater, in
which domestic politicians and their constituencies
can have some breathing room and comfort. [FN130]
Finally, these wrong cases, even *789 if once adjudicated, never fade away but come back in the future
with different names because adjudication is short of
an ultimate solution, as was witnessed in a dramatic
reincarnation of the notorious GATT DISC (1977)
[FN131] dispute as the WTO FSC (2000) [FN132]
case, both of which concern the same U.S. tax break
measures tantamount to prohibited subsidies.

In fact, a GATT panel has already acknowledged
this inherent limitation of remedies. In Superfund
(1987) in which a U.S. domestic tax was declared
discriminatory, the panel admitted the possibility that
even a GATT-consistent non-discriminatory remedy
could result in a negative trade impact to both domestic and international commerce if the United
States raises the tax rate for domestic producers to
comply with the national treatment obligation, instead of lowering the tax rate for foreigners up to the
point that the tax rate *790 is leveled with that for domestic producers. [FN133] In the same vein, Japan
raised the tax rate on shochu to reduce the tax gap
between shochu and whisky/brandies to meet the national treatment standard in complying with the panel
report in Japanese Shochu I. [FN134] This limitation
has also been envisaged under the WTO system. In
the aftermath of Hormones, the EC attempted to
tighten the regulation on other carcinogens (carbadox
and olaquindox), which were compared with hormones in dispute, in order to create a nondiscriminatory situation by way of implementing the
Appellate Body decision. [FN135] Likewise, in the
aftermath of Australian Salmon, the Australian government re-examined its rules on the importation of
ornamental fish, which was compared with the salmon in dispute, for the same purpose as the EC had
in mind in the post-Hormones process. [FN136]

3-2. Welfare Loss and Distributive Injustice
WTO remedies tend to mirror the very nature of
substantive obligations whose breach they intend to
remedy. However, those remedies, in parallel with
the reach of breached obligations, could still remain
suboptimal even after full compliance when those obligations mandate a limited extent of behavioral
change by the losing party. For instance, the principle
of non-discrimination enshrined in various GATT/
WTO rules, such as the National Treatment principle,

This re-regulatory and trade-restricting aspect of
certain WTO remedies tends to carry seriously negative implications on the domestic economy in light of

© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

65 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 763

Page 12

welfare loss and distributive injustice. To create yet
another trade barrier in the name of the WTO, remedies certainly result in market distortion and welfare
loss without serving any legitimate regulatory purpose. Moreover, considering that most tax measures
falling under the WTO law are an “indirect tax”
levied on products, collection of those taxes in compliance with the panel/Appellate Body decisions
tends to be “regressive,” hurting the poor more than
the rich in the domestic economy. Under these circumstances, the WTO remedies ironically contribute
to distributive injustice in the domestic dimension,
which may in turn breed resentment toward the WTO
system itself.
IV. Reconceptualizing the WTO Remedies
4-1. Norm-Building as a Communal Remedy
The Significance of Norm-Building Under the WTO
System
The contractual framework of GATT 1947, as
well as its lingering legacy in the WTO, empowered
the contracting parties (Members) to retain a *791
considerable degree of authority with which to dispose of the panel proceeding. Virtually in any stage,
they could halt or undo the whole proceeding based
on either political or pragmatic motivation. Often,
parties concerned realized only after the panel process began that their disputes would be better addressed by negotiation and settlement, rather than by
adjudication. [FN137] Although this ethos of settlement may fulfill part of the remedial functions of the
dispute settlement system, [FN138] such ethos, if
prevalent, could undermine the effort to establish a
legal community of international trade.
Critically, however, the aforementioned private
law nature came to be tempered by the new teleology
of the global trading system that the WTO stands for.
While the old GATT 1947 pursued a rather narrow
objective of the elimination of discriminatory trade
barriers, the new WTO system upholds a broader
mission of developing “an integrated, more viable
and durable multilateral trading system . . . .”
[FN139] Such a multilateral trading system cannot be
established merely through a sum of contractual relationships among Members. Rather, this system

should be firmly premised on a constitutional perspective according to which Members are bound by
certain indisposable obligations. Under the system,
even bilateral settlements between Members are conducted in the shadow of law, not totally under political calculations. In other words, the physis of political
bargains should be tamed by the nomos of legal governance. [FN140] As a result, the system can institutionalize within itself *792 predictability and reliability. [FN141] After all, the WTO is no more a provisional executive agreement among the contracting
parties as the old GATT 1947 used to be: It is an independent international organization enjoying its own
legal identity. Therefore, under the WTO, a violation
should be deemed not as a breach of contract but as
damage to the legal system whose sole remedy is to
repair the system by re-confirming its rules. In this
sense, norm-sustaining or norm-building itself
through the dispute settlement mechanism is a collective, communal remedy under the WTO because it
serves the broader goal of governing the global trading community beyond merely resolving disputes
between the particular parties concerned. [FN142]
Ironically, this norm-building as a collective,
communal remedy also retains a “political” appeal.
The stability and predictability that norm-building
can provide serves governments and states in various
ways, including reducing the amount of administrative and diplomacy costs. In this regard, Robert Hudec
trenchantly observes that “[g]overnments . . . unusually have a longer-term interest in the efficacy of the
legal relationships they have established with other
governments, and so they are more inclined to act in
ways designed to preserve those relationships. Ultimately, the compliance decisions of governments are
determined more by calculated self-interest than by
force.” [FN143]
New WTO Jurisprudence for Norm-Building
As discussed above, a norm, [FN144] not a contract, should be the operating code for the global trading system, and norm-building itself regarded as a
collective, communal remedy with which to maintain
and improve the system. Considering this public
nature, the WTO norm must be defined, taking into
consideration diverse values and interests advocated
and represented in the system. In other words, the
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norm should be subtle and accommodating enough to
enjoy legitimacy from a broad range of constituencies
and minimize resistance from any violated member in
light of compliance. After all, in the *793 absence of
effective acceptance of and compliance with such a
norm, the global trading system would soon be paralyzed, being relegated to the status of a jungle in
which only power politics tends to determine its destiny.
To explore and define such a norm necessitates
revisiting the institutional history of the global trading system. [FN145] What the framers of the system
sought to accomplish through GATT was to foster
free trade through a series of tariff reductions and to
police self-defeating mercantilist protection. This
anti-protectionist telos eventually led to a built-in
pro-trade bias in GATT itself. Non-trade social concerns, such as human health and environmental protection, have been treated as mere exceptions to the
general obligations, such as National Treatment.
[FN146] However, this pro-trade bias could not be
sustained when domestic regulations received greater
attention than before, and traditional trade policy
measures, such as tariffs and quotas, have begun to
vanish. Therefore, the global trading system has
come to require a new telos which is capable of transcending the narrow purpose of anti-protection while
at the same time connoting a much broader ideal of
integration that ensures that both trade values and social values are upheld not in a competing, but in a coherent and synergetic fashion.
Critically, the new telos was also reflected in the
hermeneutical attitude of the Appellate Body created
as part of the new WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Under the old GATT, panels focused on the content of a given domestic regulation itself in their judicial review, which often resulted in a presumptive
conclusion that such a measure was not necessary or
even rationally unrelated to the attainment of social
values of the regulating state. For instance, in the
Thai Cigarette case, the old GATT panel categorically disregarded a domestic regulatory need to restrict
the importation of tobacco as unnecessary to protect
human health because this measure was not traderestrictive. [FN147] According to the Thai Cigarette
panel, the import restrictions could be considered ne-

cessary “only if there were no alternative measure
*794 consistent with the General Agreement or less
inconsistent with it, which Thailand could reasonably
be expected to employ to achieve its health policy objectives.” [FN148] This second-guessing or negation
of legitimate policy objectives often infuriated domestic policy makers and thus diminished their perception of GATT's legitimacy.
However, under the new WTO system the Appellate Body directed its interpretive focus to the
“manner” in which a given domestic regulation is applied, and not to the regulation itself. In its jurisprudence, the Appellate Body has tried to scrutinize on a
case-by-case basis whether a given domestic regulation was applied consistently and evenhandedly or
whether it respected fundamental principles of law,
rather than reinvestigating, on its own accord, whether the substance of the regulation itself was necessary
or related to the achievement of the regulating states'
social policy goals. For instance, the Appellate Body
in the Gasoline case acknowledged that the U.S. Gasoline Rule itself was properly “primarily aimed at”
and thus relating to the conservation of natural resources for the purpose of Article XX(g). [FN149]
However, it subsequently rejected the United States'
argument regarding the inevitability of discrimination
against foreign refiners due to administrative difficulties on the grounds of possible regulatory cooperation with affected countries which the United States
had conducted in other areas, such as tax and antitrust. [FN150] The result of this new test was to safeguard the Members' regulatory autonomy since it
provided ample regulatory leeway for domestic regulators. Therefore, under this new test, even if a measure turned out to be a violation, the outcome was not
catastrophic but merely suspensive, demanding only
a change of application, rather than a repeal of the
statute. For instance, when the United States lost the
famous Shrimp-Turtle case in *795 1998, it was not
forced to change its domestic statute § 609, but only
its application. [FN151]
This new WTO jurisprudence holds an important
implication with respect to norm-building as a collective, communal remedy in the global trading system. The micro-managing nature of the manner-and
application-oriented jurisprudence constructs a legal
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system that addresses a wide range of ideals and
parameters that coexist and interact in the global trading system, such as free markets and social regulation, as well as international economic efficiency and
domestic regulatory need. By focusing on how to regulate rather than what to regulate, the WTO jurisprudence requires Members only to heed their regulatory
process, such as due process and fairness, yet leaves
wide open their particular choices of regulatory contents, leading them to pursue their unique domestic
regulatory objectives while complying with the multilateral trade treaties. [FN152] Consequently, the
manner-and application-oriented WTO jurisprudence
guides and fine-tunes everyday regulatory performance by Member countries, building up in the longrun a synergistic legal web between dual goals of free
markets and legitimate social regulation. This is the
most important aspect of the WTO norm that should
be understood as a communal, collective remedy under the WTO system.
Prerequisites for Norm-Building: Policy Agenda
Importantly, certain prerequisites should be met
to materialize the aforementioned collective, communal remedy. First, the content of settlement or
compensation should be fully disclosed and further
monitored to ensure that a violative measure is consistent with the WTO law. [FN153] Even if the
parties *796 concerned are satisfied with their own
settlement, it may only serve their bilateral purpose,
still running short of the rule of law sustaining the
legal system defining and structuring the WTO, unless the original violation is rectified. In this line, the
aftermath of a dispute should be closely monitored in
a transparent manner to prevent the integrity of the
WTO system from being compromised by any political deal. [FN154] For this purpose, the WTO surveillance mechanism, i.e., the “Trade Policy Review
Mechanism” (TPRM), [FN155] can be put to use
more vigorously than ever in monitoring compliance
by losing parties.
Second, in the absence of a guardianship, as seen
in the European Commission's authority to file a suit
before the European Court of Justice on behalf of the
Union, WTO members themselves should be vigorous, as legal guardians for the WTO, in filing complaints which not only concern their own interests but

also involve important legal issues from the standpoint of the legal community in general. Fortunately,
the Appellate Body has taken a lenient stance on the
issue of standing (locus standi), [FN156] paving the
way for such communal litigation to preserve the legal integrity of the system. In Banana III, the Appellate Body rejected the EC's argument that a certain
legal interest needs to be present to bring a case
against another member under the WTO dispute settlement system, and granted standing to the United
States, which barely had a direct commercial interest
in bananas. [FN157] In sum, the Appellate Body held
that a Member's decision as to whether to initiate a
complaint is discretionary and “self-regulating.”
[FN158] Under this liberal jurisprudence on standing,
WTO Members could and should fulfill their fiduciary duties as participants and beneficiaries of the
legal system by actively engaging in the dispute settlement procedures.
Third, the jurisgenerative [FN159] or jurisprudence-developing function of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism should be fullypromoted. For this
purpose, a more professional and permanent group of
panelists and Appellate Body members should be
available in order to enhance the general quality of
panel/Appellate Body reports and secure the legal coherence and integrity of decisions. Current recruits,
mostly consisting of diplomats and political *797 appointees, run short of achieving such coherence and
integrity. [FN160] In this context, William Davey,
the former Director of the Legal Affairs Division of
the WTO, proposed the establishment of a “Panel
Body,” which is more permanent and legally professional than the current ad hoc panels. [FN161] Davey
submitted that: “In my view, the need for legal expertise in virtually all cases argues for a strict requirement that panelists have some legal training. To the
extent that other kinds of expertise may be needed, it
should be taken into account in the selection of Panel
Body members so that some of them have both legal
and other expertise. [FN162] In addition, the exercise
of judicial economy should be cabined to deepen the
WTO jurisprudence. This principle has been ambiguously and inconsistently invoked by the WTO panels
and the Appellate Body, often being used to avoid the
important yet controversial legal issues that com-
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plaining parties raised. [FN163] Beyond serving to
merely resolve a specific dispute before them, panels
and the Appellate Body should be prudent and diligent enough to embrace those difficult legal issues
even if defending parties have already been ruled to
violate a sufficient number of provisions. This judicial activism seems healthy and even called for since
it eventually contributes to enrich the WTO case law
and its acquis.
Last but not least, members should refrain from
bringing the aforementioned wrong cases before the
panel to protect the judicial integrity of the WTO dispute settlement system. [FN164] Those high-profile
disputes would be better resolved through mutual cooperation in a cooled-down and workman-like manner. [FN165] At this juncture, it is worthwhile to note
that at the early days of the old GATT panel practices, the contracting parties, in particular the big
ones such as the U.S. and the EC, were circumspect
enough *798 not to overtax a burgeoning dispute settlement system by bringing in high-profile cases.
[FN166]
4-2. Dispute Prevention as a Negative Remedy
An important effect flowing from norm-building
is “dispute prevention” because the WTO norm deters and prevents future disputes. [FN167] In this
context, dispute prevention may be portrayed as a
negative remedy since it forestalls a remedial situation even before such situation transpires, rather
than to correct the situation afterwards. In a narrow
sense, dispute prevention connotes a special prevention effect. As a specific case is adjudicated and its
panel or the Appellate Body reports are issued, trade
jurisprudence comes to be formulated in a certain
subject-matter, such as National Treatment or Subsidies. This sector-specific trade jurisprudence emits
to disputants signals which help them to resolve their
disputes even without recourse to tribunals. However,
this non-adjudication or settlement is in itself distinct
from the diplomatic resolution of disputes that prevailed in the early GATT 1947 era. While such diplomatic solutions were likely to stem from the absence
of relevant case law, settlements under the WTO system, by contrast, seem to be strongly influenced by
the richness of jurisprudence. The presence of relevant case law, in other words, means that parties to

many disputes will have no reason to go to tribunals
thanks to the ease with which the probable outcome
can be predicted on the basis of existing jurisprudence. This prognosis enables such parties to settle
their disputes in the shadow of the law.
On the other hand, in a broad sense, dispute prevention represents a general prevention effect. As the
bulk of case law is accumulated and its compliance
becomes more regular, the general attitudes of potential disputants toward adversarial legal contests tend
to become more moderate. Under these circumstances, adjudication can be invoked in a less emotional manner and motivated byless political considerations. Rather, adjudication is understood to contribute to further clarification and development of international trade law beyond the existing one. This
mature phenomenon is critical to the institutional
health of the global trading system since it can effectively de-fatigue the system. Not only abuse or misuse, but also overuse of the dispute settlement mechanism is pathological to the system in its entirety, in
particular *799 considering a still young institutional
age of the WTO. Moreover, the unprecedented number of WTO memberships as well as the frequency
and density of their daily transactions make the challenge of docket control more daunting than ever. Under these circumstances, dispute prevention certainly
helps avoid a system overload via reducing the number of unnecessary disputes.
4-3. Connecting the WTO Remedies to the Domestic
Remedies
Conventional Approaches
The WTO system exists not merely for the intergovernmental welfare between and among Members,
but also for the interests of the system's microparticipants such as consumers, producers or farmers.
In this regard, the rule of law in the WTO as a collective, communal remedy, as discussed above, can
eventually serve the welfare and interests of individual economic players through securing the stability
and predictability of the WTO system. One recent
WTO panel eloquently highlighted this profound
premise of the WTO and succinctly coined it
“indirect effect.” [FN168] The Section 301 panel
held that:
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7.76 The security and predictability in
question are of “the multilateral trading system.” The multilateral trading system is, per
force, composed not only of States but also, indeed mostly, of individual economic operators.
The lack of security and predictability affects
mostly these individual operators. . . .
7.78
It may, thus, be convenient in the GATT/WTO
legal order to speak not of the principle of direct effect but of the principle of indirect effect.
[FN169]
This “indirect effect” nonetheless
may sound empty in practice to the injured individual because the WTO remedies are directed to Member countries, not their nationals
who do not even have standing in the WTO
dispute settlement proceeding. Then, would it
be possible to incorporate a certain WTO rule
or jurisprudence in the realm of a domestic judicial system, thereby enabling domestic victims to take advantage of domestic remedies?
[FN170] An immediate *800 answer to this
question would be the adoption of direct effect
that empowers or enfranchises individuals to
directly sue Member countries or other individuals before the domestic court on the
ground of violation of WTO rules. [FN171]
This proactive doctrine originally devised under EU law attempts to constitutionalize the
WTO law in the domestic terrain so that it can
serve to internalize certain fundamental WTO
provisions. [FN172] It is often understood as a
legal instrument to induce compliance with the
WTO law through “‘deputizing’ or ‘coopting’
the domestic legal system, or . . . making the
domestic rule of law ‘hostage’ to compliance
with the . . . [WTO] law.” [FN173] However,
in most dualist countries where the WTO
Agreement should be nationalized through independent domestic legal instruments in order
to achieve a domestic legal effect, such direct
effect cannot be accommodated without a special legal ground, such as “self-executing treaties.” [FN174] Moreover, considering the lack
of sophisticated legal infrastructure and jurisprudence *801 with which to operate the direct
effect doctrine, unlike the EU, its adoption in
the WTO context sounds rather impractical.

[FN175] For this reason, even advocates of
direct effect usually take a modest approach in
this tricky issue. [FN176]
Another methodology linking the WTO panel/
Appellate Body reports to domestic remedies may be
conceived through an analogy of the “recognition and
enforcement” of foreign court decisions. Grounded
on various rationales such as comity, domestic courts
have long recognized and enforced foreign court decisions and bestowed certain legal effects on them.
[FN177] Admittedly, this analogy may invite some
criticism in that the WTO itself is not a sovereign entity but an international organization created by sovereign members, and that the reports issued by panels
or the Appellate Body are not technically court decisions but mere recommendations. Yet, considering
the long-respected half-century of jurisprudence as
well as a more legalized adjudicative system under
the WTO, such a formalistic objection can be contained to certain extents. However, a critical demerit
of this approach is that it requires either proper
amendments of the WTO Agreement or accommodative domestic legal infrastructure, both of which
seem radical and unrealistic under current circumstances. [FN178] In other words, it would still be
*802 impractical to think of a situation where a domestic court orders monetary compensation for an
importer suing its own country based on the direct recognition of a corresponding WTO Appellate Body
decision which struck down the country's trade restriction that harmed the importer.
A New Approach: “Indirect Recognition”
Instead, one may reasonably speculate on a more
implied, nuanced way of delivering the WTO panel
and the Appellate Body decisions to the domestic judicial system and providing domestic remedies to injured individuals. As long as domestic judges comprehend and sympathize with the contents of those
WTO panel or Appellate Body reports which involve
the same factual matrices as their own domestic
cases, they can judicially incorporate, albeit indirectly, those decisions in various ways into the domestic jurisprudence. [FN179] For instance, domestic
judges can simply attempt to avoid conflict between
WTO panel or Appellate Body decisions and their
own domestic decisions; [FN180] they can cross-
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fertilize the WTO panel or the Appellate Body decisions from a comparativist standpoint; [FN181]
they can cite or quote certain portions of those panel
or the Appellate Body decisions if such citation or
quotation is likely to strengthen their own judicial
reasoning. [FN182]
*803 More critically, local judges can espouse the
main holdings of the WTO panel or the Appellate
Body decisions by employing basic legal principles
that most domestic constitutions or constitutive treaties include, such as the Commerce Clause, [FN183]
Supremacy Clause, [FN184] Equal Protection Clause,
[FN185] and Due Process Clause [FN186] in U.S.
law as well as the “Non-Discrimination” principle
[FN187] or “Due Process” provision [FN188] in EU
law. These fundamental legal obligations are capable
of safeguarding domestic court decisions from narrow favoritism or protectionism because these obligations defy any discriminatory treatment for the benefit of specific industries, and to the detriment of more
general economic players, including consumers, importers and distributors. [FN189] Consequently, those
economic players can secure domestic remedies, including monetary compensation, in the domestic
court, in sharp contrast with a situation under the
WTO system that renders no such direct remedies
despite the same factual and legal matrices.

In tandem with this notion of indirect recognition,
the U.S. federal courts have often issued decisions
consistent and compatible with the GATT or WTO
law in certain domestic cases that embrace international trade law issues. [FN192] Even as early as the
fifties, a Hawaiian court struck down a local statute
which violated Article III of GATT. [FN193] Lobbied by the local poultry industry, the state of Hawaii
introduced a statute that prohibited anyone from
selling any foreign eggs without a placard carrying
the words “WE SELL FOREIGN EGGS” printed and
displayed in such an eye-catching way that consumers would certainly notice them. [FN194] The
court first opined that the statute should follow the
provisions of GATT grounded on the Supremacy
*805 Clause of the U.S. Constitution. [FN195] Then,
the court itself applied and interpreted GATT, concluding that the statute violated GATT Article III for
treating imported eggs less favorably than domestic
ones which did not bear such a burdensome requirement, and at the same time that the statute did not
qualify for GATT Article XX exception. [FN196]
This is a monumental case since it demonstrated with
eloquence the possibility that the court can accommodate GATT in the context of domestic law,
thereby rendering domestic remedies to domestic
complainants who have suffered from certain violations of international trade law.

As a matter of fact, the basic spirit underlying the
aforementioned proposal of “indirect recognition,”
i.e., harmonizing as much as possible the domestic
law with the international law, can also be found
elsewhere in terms of both legal doctrines and academic theses. For instance, the famed Charming
Betsy doctrine under U.S. constitutional jurisprudence established that even facially unambiguous text
could be interpreted against such language if textual
interpretation would violate the law of nations or international law. [FN190] More recently, eminent constitutional law scholars and even a U.S. Supreme
Court Justice have begun to raise their voices for an
argument that domestic judges should listen more to
their foreign counterparts, and that *804 domestic
court decisions be more attuned to foreign, international law (court decisions) in similar subject-matter.
[FN191]

For another empirical confirmation of indirect recognition, a U.S. district court struck down as unconstitutional a Puerto Rican sanitary regulation mandating the inspection as well as the collection of an inspection fee on all imported pigeon peas. [FN197]
The regulation also stipulated that any importer who
failed to pay the fee would lose her business license
in Puerto Rico. [FN198] The court held this regulation to be illegal for violating the Commerce Clause
of the U.S. Constitution because the Puerto Rican
regulation flatly discriminated against interstate commerce when it imposed substantial costs on pigeon
pea importers which were not borne by their local
counterparts. [FN199] This decision provided remedies in the domestic context to victims who had
suffered from violations of international trade law,
such as GATT Article III (National Treatment), and
the SPS Agreement, [FN200] which addresses issues
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on trade and sanitary measures.
This trend of indirect recognition that eventuates
in harmony or convergence between domestic and international court decisions is not limited to U.S. soil.
In the aftermath of the Bananas saga, Chiquita has recently filed a lawsuit for $525 million in damages
against the EC in the Court of First Instance of the
European Communities. [FN201] Facing Commission Regulation No. 2362/98, which was launched to
comply with the Bananas III decision but later struck
down as WTO-inconsistent by a WTO arbitration
panel, Chiquita claimed to have suffered from substantial loss of profits as a result of the *806 discriminatory license distribution system that the regulation
created. [FN202] In its complaint, Chiquita alleged
that the omission had breached not only the WTO
rules but also “the principle of nondiscrimination, the
freedom to pursue trade or business as well as the
principle of good faith in international law.” [FN203]
This case seems inspiring in that it provides for the
community legal system a new, fresh stimulus in
terms of local, regional remedies for violations of international trade law.
Markedly, a couple of factors seem to contribute
to this trend of indirect recognition or interpretive
harmony between foreign, international and domestic
courts. [FN204] First, the nature of the subject-matter, i.e., international trade, tends to mobilize common interests and sympathies among foreign, international and domestic court judges. Due to their interpenetrating and universal nature, trade-related cases
cover a wide range of jurisdictions: interstate, regional or international. In other words, the ever-growing
economic interdependence among different trading
nations or institutions also tends to nurture a “global
ethos” [FN205] among domestic judges who continuously confront cases that involve international or
transnational economic issues. [FN206]
Second, the nature of judges or panelists as interlocutors of legal discourse on specific issues such as
international trade also tends to enable them to sympathize with each other. As professional lawyers or
jurists, [FN207] those members of an “epistemic
community” [FN208] are likely to establish a *807
“transjudicial” network [FN209] in which they can

exchange and share each other's legal views and interpretations. [FN210] In fact, we have already witnessed a prototype of such transjudicial communication in the context of the rich cooperative relationship
between the European Court of Justice and Member
States' courts. [FN211] This delicate and nuanced judicial partnership made an essential contribution to
European integration through the phenomenon of judicial empowerment. [FN212] A similar judicial partnership can also be found in the U.S. context between
federal and state courts. In the evolution of U.S. federalism, federal and state courts have been able to
maintain a subtle cooperation. [FN213] If such a judicial partnership functions well, despite the existence
of different legal cultures, judges' common codes,
i.e., basic, fundamental principles of law, which are
ubiquitously manifested in the domestic constitutions, tend to facilitate them to get connected and enlightened with each other. [FN214] Under these fertile circumstances, domestic *808 and foreign, international court decisions are likely to converge on certain legal issues involving international trade, thereby
realizing the indirect recognition which can produce
domestic remedies for the violation of WTO rules.
[FN215]
Conclusion
It is important to note that the true nature of WTO
remedies reflects the raison d'etre of the WTO system
itself. If we understand the WTO as a genuinely integrated multilateral legal system beyond its intergovernmental genesis, WTO remedies should be
firmly hinged on growing norm-building that can ensure a stable and predictable operation of the system.
Under such a legal system, WTO remedies not only
address disputes but also prevent them in a practical
manner. This perspective tends to conceive WTO
remedies as public goods for all Members beyond a
mere instrument that settles and satisfies particular
parties concerned in specific cases. At the same time,
however, this macro nature of WTO remedies should
not unduly alienate individual players operating within the system. Namely, the WTO remedies should
also respond to the complaining voices of down to
earth businesses who have suffered from violations of
WTO rules. Thus, it is imperative to connect WTO
remedies with domestic remedies to make the former
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palpable and workable to those everyday individual
players in this enlarged enclave of the legal community that the WTO eventually purports to create.
Notably, this transjudicial connection between the
WTO tribunal and domestic courts can be more sensitized by a nuanced use of the suggestion function
that a panel or the Appellate Body may exercise
when it renders its decision. Under DSU Article 19.1,
a panel or the Appellate Body, in addition to rendering a decision recommending a violative measure to
be brought into conformity with the WTO rules,
“may suggest ways in which the Member concerned
could implement the recommendations.” [FN216]
Out of many ways of such implementation, a judicial
one is particularly relevant to the transjudicial connection discussed here in that a panel or the Appellate
Body can offer *809 certain remedial guidelines
which domestic courts may refer to when adjudicating domestic cases which involve the same or related
legal issues.
In conclusion, this “collective judicial deliberation” [FN217] through the transjudicial connection
between the WTO tribunal and domestic courts can
contribute to a more advanced and mature dimension
of rule of law in the global trading system, which
marks the true nature of WTO remedies. [FN218]
This is one of the surest ways in which the WTO
could serve its own legitimacy in this interdependent
and integrative world. [FN219]
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421, 424-25 (2000).
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GATT B.I.S.D. (34th Supp.) at 136, §§ 5.1.3-5.1.12
(1988) [WTO Doc. Symbol L/6175] [hereinafter Superfund].
[FN36]
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WTO Agreement, supra note 2 [hereinafter DSU],
art. 21, ¶ 5 (emphasis added).
[FN37]
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. See infra § 2-2.

[FN39]

. Article 30
Cessation and Non-Repetition
The
State responsible for the internationally wrongful act
is under an obligation:
(a) To cease that act, if it
is continuing;
(b) To offer appropriate assurances
and guarantees of non-repetition, if circumstances so
require. U.N. GAOR Int'l Law Comm., 53d Sess.,
Supp. No. 10, at 51, U.N. Doc. No. A/56/10 (2001)
[hereinafter Draft Articles on Responsibility of
States]. G.A. Res. 83 U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess.,
Agenda item 162, at Annex, pt. 2, ch. 1, art. 30, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/56/83 (2001). See also Resolution of the
General Assembly of the UN, A/RES/56/83, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful
Acts, adopted on Dec. 12, 2001.
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WTO Agreement, 5 J. Int'l Econ. L. 307, 315 (2002);
Grane, supra note 32, at 759.
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[FN42]
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Doc. Symbol L/2074].
[FN45]
. United States-Denial of Most-Favoured
Nation Trading States as to Non-Rubber Footwear
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[FN46]
. GATT, supra note 7, art. XX, pmbl.
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(emphasis added)).
[FN47]
. WTO Appellate Body Report on United
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WT/DS58/AB/R, ¶ 115 (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter
Shrimp-Turtle].
[FN48]
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Shrimp-Turtle, the USTR emphasized that the U.S.
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But Faults US Implementation, (Oct. 12, 1998), at http:// www.ustr.gov/releases/1998/10/98-92.pdf (last
visited on Feb. 16, 2004).
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[FN52]
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Id.
[FN53]
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[FN55]

. DSU, supra note 36, art. 22, ¶ 1.

[FN56]

. Id., art. 22, ¶ 2 (emphasis added).

[FN57]
. Id., art. 22, ¶ 1; Pauwelyn, supra note 54,
at 337 n.12.
[FN58]
. See, e.g., WTO Notification of Mutually
Agreed Solution, Korea-Measures Concerning the
Shelf-Life of Products, WT/DS5/5, G/AG/W/8, July
31, 1995 (“The treatment accorded in the annexes to
imported products shall be no less favourable than
the treatment accorded to like products of national
origin or to like products of any other country.”).
[FN59]

(Pol. v. Germany), 1928 P.C.I.J. (serv. A) No. 17
(Sept.
13),
available
at
http://
www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/cases/chorzow2law.h
tm (last visited Feb. 25, 2004) (emphasis added).

. Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzow

[FN60]
. Draft Articles on Responsibility of
States, supra note 39, art. 35 (Restitution).
Article 35
Restitution
A State responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under
an obligation to make restitution, that is, to reestablish the situation which existed before the
wrongful act was committed, . . . .
Id. The ILC
defined “reparation” broadly including restitution and
compensation. Id., art. 34.
[FN61]
. Patricio Grane comprehensively surveyed retrospective remedies in GATT/WTO case
law that mostly fall under the anti-dumping or subsidies law. Grane, supra note 32, at 763-69. See also
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, International Competition
Rules for the GATT/WTO World Trade and Legal
System, 27 J. World Trade 35 (1993).
[FN62]
. Under the GATT 1947 the losing party
was allowed to veto the panel decision, those panel
reports that recommended retrospective remedies
were often vetoed and thus failed to be adopted. See
Grane, supra note 32, at 764. See also Palmeter &
Mavroidis, supra note 54, at 162-23.
[FN63]
. See Grane, supra note 32, at 766-69. See
also WTO Panel Report on Section 129(c)(1) of the
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, WT/DS221/R, ¶
3.41 (July 15, 2002) (noting that both disputing
parties, the United States and Canada, agreed on the
“principle of prospective implementation” under the
DSU).
[FN64]
. WTO Panel Report on Australian Subsidies to Producers and Exporters of Automotive
Leather, WT/DS126/RW, ¶ 6.39 (Jan. 21, 2000). The
Panel held that:
Based on the ordinary meaning of the term
“withdraw the subsidy,” read in context, and in light
of its object and purpose, and in order to give it effective meaning, we conclude that the recommendation to “withdraw the subsidy” provided for in Article
4.7 of the SCM Agreement is not limited to prospective action only but may not encompass repayment of
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the prohibited subsidy.
Id. (emphasis in original).
[FN65]
. Grane, supra note 32, at 769.
[FN66]

. DSU, supra note 36, art. 1, ¶ 1.

[FN67]

. GATT, supra note 7, art. XXIII, ¶ 2.

[FN68]
¶ 14.

. DSU, supra note 36, art. 16, ¶ 4; art. 17,

[FN69]
. Hudec, A Developing Country Perspective, supra note 10, at 86.
[FN70]

. Id.

[FN71]

. Id.

[FN72]
1.4.

. FSC Article 22.6 Report, supra note 3, ¶

[FN73]

. Id. ¶ 3.1.

[FN74]

. Id. ¶ A 34.

[FN75]

. Id. ¶¶ 5.41, 5.57, 5.59.

[FN76]

. Id. ¶ 5.41.

[FN77]

. Id. ¶¶ 5.32-5.43.

[FN78]

. Id. ¶¶ 5.45-5.48.

[FN79]
. Draft Articles on Responsibility of
States, supra note 39, at art. 51 (Proportionality).
[FN80]
. DSU, supra note 36, at art. 21, ¶ 5
(emphasis added).
[FN81]

. Id. art. 21, ¶ 6 (emphasis added).

[FN82]
6, ¶ 1.1.

. Banana III Arbitration (U.S.), supra note

[FN83]

. See id. ¶ 4.6.
[T]he European Communities has repeatedly
emphasized that any determination of the amount of
concessions to be suspended would have to be based
exclusively on the amount of the nullification or
impairment caused by its revised regime if it were
found to be WTO-inconsistent-albeit in another procedure before us, i.e. in our capacity as reconvened
panelists under Article 21.5.
Id. (emphasis ad-

ded). “[T]he European Communities argues that if we
consider the WTO consistency of its banana regime
in an arbitration proceeding under Article 22, we will
deprive Article 21.5 of its raison d'etre.” Id. ¶ 4.11
(emphasis added).
[FN84]
. Id. ¶¶ 4.1-4.15.
[FN85]
. See, e.g., WTO Panel Report on United
States Anti-Dumping on Dynamic Random Access
Memory Semiconductors (DRAMS) of One Megabit
or Above from Korea, WT/DS99/RW (Nov. 7, 2000);
WTO Appellate Body Report on United States Import Prohibition on Certain Shrimp Products, WT/
DS58/AB/RW (Oct. 20, 2001); WTO Appellate Body
Report on United States Tax Treatment of “Foreign
Sales Corporations,” WT/DS108/AB/RW (Jan. 14,
2002).
[FN86]
. This problem of the sequence or sequencing is being reviewed by Members as one of the reform agendas for the DSU. Dispute Settlement:
Members Discuss “Sequencing” and Timeframe Constraints, 6 Bridges Wkly. Trade News Dig., Mar. 19,
2002,
available
at
http://www.ictsd.org/weekly/02-03-19/index.htm (last
visited Feb. 19, 2004).
[FN87]
. Christine D. Gray, Judicial Remedies in
International Law 6 (1987). See also Carmody, supra
note 40, at 312.
[FN88]

. Bello, supra note 32, at 417.

[FN89]

. Id.

[FN90]

. Id. at 416-17.

[FN91]

. Id. at 417.

[FN92]

. See supra text accompanying note 9.

[FN93]
. See generally Michael K. Young, Dispute Resolution in the Uruguay Round: Lawyers' Triumph over Diplomats, 29 Int'l Law. 389 (1995)
(regarding the comparison between the old GATT
1947 and the new WTO system in terms of the ruleorientedness).
[FN94]

. Jackson, supra note 32, at 60-64.
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[FN95]
. Id. at 63 (emphasis added). In fact, this
preference for the withdrawal of the measures concerned vis-a-vis compensation seems to have already
been established in the old GATT system. See 1979
DSU, supra note 34, at 210. See Carmody, supra note
40, at 315; Grane, supra note 32, at 760-61 (regarding
supporting views for the priority of cessation
(withdrawal) as remedies).
[FN96]
. Draft Articles on Responsibility of
States, supra note 39, art. 39 (Continued Duty of Performance).
[FN97]
. Id. art. 49 (Object and Limits of Countermeasures).
[FN98]

. Shelton, supra note 51, at 40.

[FN99]
. Alan O. Sykes, The Remedy for Breach
of Obligations under the WTO Dispute Settlement
Understanding: Damages or Specific Performance?,
in New Directions in International Economic Law:
Essays in Honor of John H. Jackson 347, 347 (Marco
Bronckers & Reinhard Quick eds., 2000) [hereinafter
New Directions].
[FN100]

. Id. at 349-52.

[FN101]

. Id. at 352-54.

[FN102]

. Id. at 354-57.

[FN103]
. See WTO Agreement, supra note 2, art.
I (Establishment of the Organization), art. II (Scope
of the WTO), art. III (Functions of the WTO), art. IV
(Structure of the WTO), art. VIII (Status of the
WTO).
[FN104]

. Sykes, supra note 99, at 356.

[FN105]

. See Hormones, supra note 5.

[FN106]
. Sykes, supra note 99, at 356-57
(emphasis added).
[FN107]
. See Robert E. Hudec, GATT Dispute
Settlement after the Tokyo Round: An Unfinished
Business, 13 Cornell Int'l L.J. 145, 159 (1980). See
also William J. Davey, Dispute Settlement in GATT,
11 Fordham Int'l L.J. 51, 67-78 (1987); John H. Jack-

son, The Jurisprudence of International Trade: The
DISC Case in GATT, 72 Am. J. Int'l L. 747, 779-80
(1978) [hereinafter Jackson, The DISC Case] (raising
a similar concept of “big cases,” which cannot be
handled properly by adjudication).
[FN108]
. WTO Ministerial Conference, The
ACP-EC Partnership Agreement, WT/MIN(01)/15
(Nov. 14, 2001) (authorizing a waiver to GATT Article I (MFN) for both EC and ACP countries and thus
ending a long-standing banana dispute).
[FN109]
. See Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., International
Organization in Their Legal Setting 554 (2d ed.
1993). This deterrent function of sanctions can also
be found in other areas of international law. See, e.g.,
Ronald B. Mitchell, International Oil Pollution at
Sea: Environmental Policy and Treaty Compliance
291-92 (1994) (describing the International Maritime
Organization's (IMO's) successful regulation of international oil pollution by oil tankers through enforcing
the mechanism of the International Oil Pollution Prevention (IOPP) certificate without which tankers
could be barred from doing business or detained in
port under the International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships).
[FN110]
. See, e.g., Pauwelyn, supra note 54, at
345 (arguing for “collective enforcement”); Marc L.
Busch & Eric Reinhardt, Testing International Trade
Law: Empirical Studies of GATT/WTO Dispute Settlement, in The Political Economy of International
Trade Law: Essays in Honor of Robert E. Hudec 457,
478 (Daniel L. M. Kennedy & James D. Southwick
eds., 2002) [hereinafter Political Economy]
(proposing “stiffer penalties and speedier legal authorization for retaliation”). But cf. Charnovitz, supra
note 8, at 825-27 (suggesting a softer notion of
“fine”); id. at 831 (suggesting “compulsory and automatic compensation”). To strengthen the impact of
sanctions, the U.S. Congress has recently passed a
bill containing the so-called “carousel provision” to
rotate the target products for sanctions every six
months. See id. at 797 n.36; Trade and Development
Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-200, § 407, 114 Stat.
251, 293.
[FN111]

. See International Financial Institution
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Advisory Commission, Report (Mar. 2000), available
at http://www.house.gov/jec/imf/meltzer.htm (last
visited on Feb. 19, 2004); Charnovitz, supra note 8, at
797.
[FN112]
. See Charnovitz, supra note 8, at 816-17;
Pauwelyn, supra note 54, at 338.
[FN113]
. See Henrik Horn & Petros C. Mavroidis, Remedies in the WTO Dispute Settlement System
and Developing Country Interests (1999), at http://
www1.worldbank.org/wbiep/trade/papers_2000/BPdi
sput.pdf (last visited on Feb. 18, 2004) (arguing that
the lack of a workable sanction mechanism in the
WTO tends to privatize the sanction against violators,
which puts “economically and politically weak”
countries in a disadvantageous position).
[FN114]
. WTO-Regime for the Importation, Sale
and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/ARB/ECU
(Mar. 24, 2000), ¶ 177 (emphasis added). See also
Hudec, A Developing Country Perspective, supra
note 10, at 84 (observing that the WTO's greater emphasis on retaliation makes the “dispute settlement
system even more one-sided than before,” favoring
larger developed countries); David Palmeter & Stanmir A. Alexandrov, “Inducing Compliance,” in WTO
Dispute Settlement, in Political Economy, supra note
110, at 662.
[FN115]
. Banana Dispute: Ecuador and EC Hold
Talks to Avoid WTO Dispute, 5 Bridges Wkly. Trade
News Dig., Apr. 24, 2001, available at http://
www.itsd.org/html/weekly/24-04-01/Story3.html
(last visited on Feb. 18, 2004) (quoting an informed
source stating that “it is difficult for Ecuador as a
small developing country with severe economic problems to resist major pressure from the US and the EU
over the banana issue . . . .”).
[FN116]

. Pauwelyn, supra note 54, at 343, 810.

[FN117]
. Steve Charnovitz, Should the Teeth be
Pulled?: An Analysis of WTO Sanctions, in Political
Economy, supra note 110, at 622.
[FN118]
. Id. See also Andreas F. Lowenfeld,
Remedies Along with Rights: Institutional Reform in
the New GATT, 88 Am. J. Int'l L. 477, 487 (1994)

(observing that retaliation is not favored under the
DSU because it is by definition against the WTO
rules and also erects a new trade barrier).
[FN119]
. Charnovitz argues that a WTO-approved sanction victimizes domestic consumers who
may feel unrepresented under the WTO system and
finds a basis for his argument in the dicta of recent
case law (Section 301) emphasizing the position of
individuals in the WTO system. Charnovitz, supra
note 8, at 811. See also id. at 815 (quoting Adam
Smith arguing in the Wealth of Nations that when retaliation fails to secure the dismantling of foreign
trade barriers, “it seems a bad method of compensating the injury done to certain classes of our people, to
do another injury ourselves, not only to those classes,
but to almost all the other classes of them”); Gary N.
Horlick, Problems with the Compliance Structure of
the WTO Dispute Resolution Process, in Political
Economy, supra note 110, at 631, 641 (stating that
“the purpose of the WTO is not to impose 100 percent duties on importers of Roquefort cheese, or other
innocent bystanders”); Frieder Roessler, Domestic
Policy Objectives and the Multilateral Trade Order:
Lessons from the Past, 19 U. Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 513,
528 (1998) (arguing that “a trade sanction inflicts
costs both on the imposing nation and on the target
nation, and the cost for the former can sometimes exceed that of the latter”).
[FN120]
. See Charnovitz, supra note 8, at 815
(viewing that trade sanctions tend to stimulate domestic protectionist sentiment). Carmody observed
that this self-destructive effect of sanctions has contributed to the rarity of actual implementation of
sanctions under the WTO system when winning
parties are authorized to retaliate. Carmody, supra
note 40, at 320.
[FN121]
. This argument stands powerful even in
the domestic sense. See Robert E. Hudec, The Role
of Judicial Review in Preserving Liberal Foreign
Trade Policies, in National Constitutions and International Economic Law 503, 503-08 (Meinhard Hilf &
Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann eds., 1993) (discussing
Tumlir's critique of protectionism as “constitutional
failure”).
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[FN122]
. See Robert E. Hudec, The GATT Legal
System and World Trade Diplomacy 196-97 (2d ed.
1990) (trenchantly observing that “[t]he symbolic
purpose of retaliation is largely fulfilled by the fanfare which surrounds the formal decision authorizing
it” and that “[a]ctual implementation of the retaliatory measures tends to be something of an anticlimax”).
[FN123]
. Oran R. Young, Compliance and Public
Authority: A Theory with International Applications
106-08 (1979).
[FN124]
. Joel P. Trachtman, Bananas, Direct Effect and Compliance, 10 Eur. J. Int'l L. 655, 655
(1999).
[FN125]

nomic Law: The Political Theater Dimension, 17 U.
Pa. J. Int'l Econ. L. 9, 10 (1996).
[FN131]
. United States-Tax Legislation (DISC),
Nov. 12, 1976, GATT B.I.S.D. (23d Supp.) at 98
(1977) [WTO Doc. Symbol L/4422]. See generally
Jackson, The DISC Case, supra note 107; Robert E.
Hudec, Reforming GATT Adjudication Procedures:
The Lessons of the DISC Case, 72 Minn. L. Rev.
1443 (1988).
[FN132]
. WTO Appellate Body Report on U.S.
Tax Treatment for “Foreign Sales Corporations,”
WT/DS108/1 (Mar. 20, 2000). See generally Julie
Elizabeth McGuire, World Trade Organization Finds
U.S. Foreign Sales Corporation Violates EU Trade
Agreements, 2 Law. J. 5 (2000).

. Id. at 678.
[FN133]

[FN126]
. In this regard, wrong cases are
“polycentric” in that they “create a different complicated pattern of tensions” and notably involve
“allocation of economic resources.” See Lon L.
Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92
Harv. L. Rev. 353, 394-404 (1978).
[FN127]
. Cf. Charnovitz, supra note 8, at 808-09
(observing that cases like Hormones and Bananas
may be “unrepresentative of the diversity of disputes
on which sanctions might be tested” on account of
“deep-seated political choices by the EC on health,
culture, and historical trade preferences”). Of course,
under a different situation where domestic resistance
against a particular panel or the Appellate Body reports can be accommodated, the losing party government may capitalize on “foreign pressure” to reform
certain policy areas. Id. at 813-14.
[FN128]

. See supra note 107.

[FN129]
. To prevent these wrong cases from being adjudicated, the “consultation” process may be
utilized and thus proper settlements result. See William J. Davey, WTO Dispute Settlement: Segregating
the Useful Political Aspects and Avoiding
“Over-Legalization,” in New Directions, supra note
99, at 295-56.
[FN130]

. Robert E. Hudec, International Eco-

. Superfund, supra note 35, ¶ 5.1.9.

[FN134]
. Japan-Customs Duties, Taxes and Labeling Practices on Imported Wines and Alcoholic
Beverages, Nov. 10, 1987, GATT B.I.S.D. (34th
Supp.) at 83, ¶ 2.8 [WTO Doc. Symbol L/6216].
[FN135]
. See David G. Victor, The Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Agreement of the World Trade Organization: An Assessment After Five Years, 32 N.Y.U.
J. Int'l L. & Pol. 865, 924-34 (2000).
[FN136]

. See id.

[FN137]
. See, e.g., United States-Imposition of
Countervailing Duty without Injury Criterion, Sep.
30, 1981, L/5192. In this case, India complained
about the United States' application of its countervailing duty law to Indian products without the determination of “material injury.” Although the panel was established to review this case, the United States and
India reached a settlement and the latter withdrew the
complaint in the middle of the panel proceeding. See
Hudec, Enforcing International Trade Law, supra
note 29, at 486-87.
[FN138]
. In fact, the original purpose of the old
GATT dispute settlement mechanism under Articles
XXII and XXIII was “settlement,” rather than
“adjudication.” See Debra P. Steger & Susan M.
Hainsworth, New Directions in International Trade

© 2007 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works.

65 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 763

Page 28

Law: WTO Dispute Settlement, in Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organisation 28, 29 (James
Cameron & Karen Campbell eds. 1998). According
to the classic Aristotelian remedial justice, such settlement seems important in that it serves the benefits
and satisfaction of “victims,” i.e., defendant countries
in the case of WTO disputes. See Shelton, supra note
51, at 38-39.
[FN139]

. WTO Agreement, supra note 2, pmbl.

[FN140]
. See Carmody, supra note 40, at 314; II
Y.B. Int'l Comm. 55 (1993) ( “not only the interest of
the injured State or States but also the interests of the
international community in the preservation of, and
reliance upon, the rule of law”). Cf. Jonathan I. Charney, Universal International Law, 87 Am. J. Int'l L.
529, 532 (1993) (arguing that “[t]he international legal system is supported not only by states' interests in
promoting individual rules, but also by their interests
in preserving and promoting the system as a whole”).
Regarding basic information on the metaphor of
nomos versus physis, see, e.g., Paul Ledere, The
Sophists: The Origin of Western Philosophical Ethics,
available
at
http://faculty.ccri.edu/paleclerc/ethics/sophists.shtml
(last visited on Feb. 19, 2004).
[FN141]
. Cf. Pauwelyn, supra note 54, at 341;
Superfund, supra note 35, ¶ 5.2.2 (emphasizing that
the GATT rules should not only protect current trade
but also “create the predictability needed to plan future trade”). In this regard, remedies under the WTO
system can be said to be “prospective,” rather than
“retrospective.” See Carmody, supra note 40, at 314;
Grane, supra note 32, at 760.
[FN142]
. See Kenneth Abbott, GATT as a Public
Institution: The Uruguay Round and Beyond, 18
Brook. J. Int'l L. 31, 32 (1992).
[FN143]
. Hudec, A Developing Country Perspective, supra note 10, at 82 (emphasis added).
[FN144]
. For the purpose of this paper, “WTO
norm” can be defined as an integrated set of legal expressions of the WTO system that are declared and
clarified through interpretations of the dispute settlement mechanism.

[FN145]

. See supra part I.

[FN146]

. GATT, supra note 7, arts. III, XX.

[FN147]
. “In sum, the Panel considered that there
were various measures consistent with the General
Agreement which were reasonably available to Thailand to control the quality and quantity of cigarettes
smoked and which, taken together, could achieve the
health policy goals that the Thai government pursues
by restricting the importation of cigarettes inconsistently with Article XI:1. The Panel found therefore
that Thailand's practice of permitting the sale of domestic cigarettes while not permitting the importation
of foreign cigarettes was an inconsistency with the
General Agreement not ‘necessary’ within the meaning of Article XX(b).” Thailand-Restrictions on Importation of and Internal Taxes on Cigarettes, adopted on Nov. 7, GATT B.I.S.D. (37th Supp.), at 200, ¶
81 (1991) [hereinafter Thai Cigarette] [WTO Doc.
Symbol DS10/R].
[FN148]

. Id. ¶ 75 (emphasis added).

[FN149]
. WTO Appellate Body Report, United
States-Standards for Reformulated and Conventional
Gasoline, WT/DS2/9, at 20 (May 20, 1996)
[hereinafter Gasoline (1996)] [WTO Doc. Symbol
WT/DS2/9].
[FN150]

. The Appellate Body emphasized that:
The United States must have been aware that
for these established techniques and procedures to
work, cooperative arrangements with both foreign refiners and the foreign governments concerned would
have been necessary and appropriate. . . . [I]t appears
to the Appellate Body, that the United States had not
pursued the possibility of entering into cooperative
arrangements with the governments of Venezuela and
Brazil or, if it had, not to the point where it encountered governments that were unwilling to cooperate. . . . But it does not reveal what, if any, efforts had been taken by the United States to enter into
appropriate procedures in cooperation with the governments of Venezuela and Brazil so as to mitigate
the administrative problems pleaded by the United
States.
Id. at 26.
[FN151]
. See U.S. Trade Rep., Press Release:
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WTO Appellate Body Found U.S. Sea Turtle Law
Meets WTO Criteria But Faults U.S. Implementation,
Oct.
12,
1998,
at
http://www.ustr.gov/releases/1998/10/98-92.pdf (last
visited on Feb. 19, 2004).
[FN152]
. Cf. Daniel A. Farber & Robert E. Hudec, Free Trade and the Regulatory State: A
GATT's-Eye View of the Dormant Commerce
Clause, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1401, 1406 (1994). Probably, such sophisticated jurisprudence is common to
any mature, well-advanced legal system. Donald
Kommers and Michel Waelbroeck observed this
trend in recent U.S. Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprudence. They submit that: “In the newer cases what
is regulated is less important than how it is regulated.
The practical operation of a regulatory scheme is
more important than whether it affects intrastate or
interstate commerce directly or incidentally.”
(emphasis original). Donald P. Kommers & Michel
Waelbroeck, Legal Integration and the Free Movement of Goods: The American and European Experience, in Forces and Potential for a European Identity
(Book 3), Methods, Tools and Institutions (Volume
1), Integration Through Law: European and the
American Federal Experience 165, 174 (Mauro Cappelletti et al. eds., 1985).
[FN153]

. See DSU, supra note 36, art. 22, ¶¶ 1, 8.

[FN154]
. Cf. Pauwelyn, supra note 54, at 344-45
(discussing the DSU-illegality of offsetting compensation).
[FN155]
. Trade Policy Review Mechanism, Annex 3, WTO Agreement, supra note 2 [hereinafter
TPRM].
[FN156]

. Bananas III, supra note 4, ¶ 132.

[FN157]

. Id. ¶ 132-38.

[FN158]

. Id. ¶ 135.

[FN159]
. Robert M. Cover, Nomos and Narrative, in Narrative, Violence, and the Law: The Essays
of Robert Cover 95, 110 (Martha Minow et al. eds.,
1992).

[FN160]
. Cf. Malcolm N. Shaw, A Practical Look
at the International Court of Justice, in Remedies in
International Law: The Institutional Dilemma 11, 48
(Malcolm D. Evans ed., 1998) (Evans observes that
States expect from the International Court of Justice
“an authoritative decision based on internationally
accepted criteria within the bounds of reasonable professional predictability.” (emphasis added)).
[FN161]
. William J. Davey, A Permanent Body
for WTO Dispute Settlement: Desirable or Practical?,
in Political Economy, supra note 110, 496 at 518-19.
[FN162]

. Id. at 518.

[FN163]
. See, e.g., Hormones, supra note 5, ¶
8.272 (refusing to examine the sensitive legal question of an alleged conflict or hierarchy between
GATT and the SPS Agreement).
[FN164]
. Cf. C.W. Jenks, Craftsmanship in International Law, in International Law in the Twentieth
Century 75, 80 (Leo Gross ed., 1969) (maintaining
that “[a] jurisprudence which . . . ignores and belittles
the limitations with which the rule of law operates in
practice in international affairs in the present stage of
development of the law, and a jurisprudence which
rationalizes, defends and even idealizes these limitations, are equally unhelpful and unserviceable”).
[FN165]
. For instance, the Hormones dispute
could have been addressed through a non-adjudicative solution, including an appropriate
“labeling” system, discussed in a constructive transatlantic regulatory dialogue. See Victor, supra note
135, at 921.
[FN166]
. See Davey, Dispute Settlement in
GATT, supra note 107, at 62.
[FN167]
. Cf. Roger Fisher, Improving Compliance with International Law 22-23 (1981)
(maintaining that one of the multiple objectives of
compliance is “future-oriented,” deciding “on what
ought to happen next”).
[FN168]
. WTO Panel Report on United StatesSections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974, WT/
DS152/R (Jan. 27, 2000), ¶ 7.78.
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. Id. ¶¶ 7.76, 7.78.

[FN170]
. Cf. Elisabeth Zoller, Enforcing International Law Through U.S. Legislation 6 (1985)
(observing that the remedy provided for the breach of
international law is “entirely domestic in nature since
the individualization of the breach makes redress possible as a matter of domestic law”); C.F. Amerasinghe, Local Remedies in International Law 1 (1990)
(viewing that “rule of local remedies” is accepted as
part of customary international law, codified in certain treaties such as the “International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, the European Convention
on Human Rights and the American Convention on
Human Rights” as well as raised in “international litigations before the International Court of Justice and
other arbitral tribunals”).
[FN171]
. See notably J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 Yale L.J. 2403, 2413-14
(1991). Cf. Antonio F. Perez, The International Recognition of Judgments: The Debate Between Private
and Public Law Solutions, 19 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 44,
49-50 (2001) (observing that the “direct effect” doctrine in the EU system operates in the same way as
the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. Constitution under which states are obliged to recognize and
enforce each other's judgments).
[FN172]
. See, e.g., Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann,
How to Constitutionalize International Law and Foreign Policy for the Benefit of Civil Society?, 20
Mich. J. Int'l L. 1, 30 (1998) (arguing that “European
integration law and WTO law confirm the Kantian
insight that rule of law requires compulsory judicial
protection of freedom and non-discrimination at
home and abroad”).
[FN173]
. Trachtman, supra note 124, at 657. See
also Pauwelyn, supra note 54, at 346 n.67 (“Another
tool to bolster enforcement of WTO rules would be to
give them ‘direct effect’ in national courts.”).
[FN174]
. See generally Carlos Manuel Vazquez,
The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Treaties, 89
Am. J. Int'l L. 695 (1995). See also Edith Brown
Weiss, The Rise or the Fall of International Law?, 69
Fordham L. Rev. 345, 357 (2000). Similarly, certain

treaties in the areas of civil aviation and marine transport create a “uniform regime” on domestic remedies,
requiring “the imposition of municipal liability, civil
or criminal, for breach of their terms or of regulations
drawn up by states in accordance with the treaty.”
Gray, supra note 87, at 222. Obviously, the U.S.
made it doubly sure that the WTO treaty is not a selfexecuting treaty: only the U.S. government itself can
file a suit before the U.S. court based on WTO rules.
Uruguay Round Agreements Act, Pub. L. No.
103-465, § 102(c)(1), 108 Stat. 4809, 4818 (1994).
(c) Effect of Agreement With Respect to Private
Remedies
Limitations-No person other than the
United States
(A) shall have any cause of action or defense under any of the Uruguay Round
Agreements or by virtue of congressional approval of
such an agreement, or
(B) may challenge, in any
action brought under any provision of law, any action
or inaction by any department, agency, or other instrumentality of the United States, any State, or any
political subdivision of a State on the ground that
such action or inaction is inconsistent with such
agreement.
Id.
[FN175]
. From the perspective of “cost-benefit
analysis,” Joel Trachtman and Philip Moremen
warned that “[b]efore transferring rights from states
back to individuals, we should investigate the benefits that might flow from each institutional structure,
as well as the costs, including transaction costs.” Joel
P. Trachtman & Philip M. Moremen, Costs and Benefits of Private Participation in WTO Dispute Settlement: Whose Right Is It Anyway?, 44 Harv. Int'l L. J.
221, 249 (2003). Cf. Ari Afilalo, Constitutionalization Through the Back Door: A European Perspective
on NAFTA Investment Chapter, 34 N.Y.U. J. Int. L.
& Pol. 1, 6-8 (2001) (warning that an application of
NAFTA Chapter 11 (Investment) may establish a “de
facto system of state liability through which private
parties, as compared with the EU regime, can directly
sue the Member state even for violations of general
rules governing trade in goods, not investment,” and
arguing that grey measure falling within the boundary
between trade in goods and investment should be directed to the realm of “state-to-state” litigation, compatible with the “limited level of supranational constitutionalization of NAFTA”).
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[FN176]
. See, e.g., Ronald A. Brand, Direct Effect of International Economic Law in the United
States and the European Union, 17 Nw. J. Int'l L. &
Bus. 556, 608 (1996-97) (suggesting that “[w]hile the
global system is not yet ready for the wholesale application of these developments, it is important that
we realize the need to move in a similar direction”).
Thomas Cottier & Krista Nadakavukaren Schefer,
The Relationship Between World Trade Organization
Law, National and Regional Law, 1 J. Int'l Econ. L.
83, 118-19 (1998) (arguing that “we might succeed
with a step-by-step, provision-by-provision approach
to negotiations, achieving a gradual direct effect of
most, if not all, of the WTO Agreements”). Of
course, in a legal regime where a sufficient legal infrastructure is established, direct effect tends to serve
as a vehicle to “interconnect” different legal systems.
See generally Piet Eeckhout, The Domestic Legal
Status of the WTO Agreement: Interconnecting Legal
Systems, 34 Common Mkt. L. Rev. 11, 48-55 (1997).
[FN177]
. See Frank Griffith Dawson & Ivan L.
Head, International Law, National Tribunals and the
Rights of Aliens 276 (1971) (citing Hilton v. Guyot,
159 U.S. 113 (1895)).
[FN178]
. But cf. Perez, supra note 171, at 73-82
(proposing the incorporation of recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in the WTO system
through a treaty-making process).
[FN179]
. Cf. Mohammed Bedjaoui, The Reception by National Courts of Decisions of International
Tribunals, in International Law Decisions in National
Courts 21, 22-23 (Thomas M. Franck & Gregory H.
Fox eds., 1996) [hereinafter National Courts]
(broadly defining “reception” as a national court's
reference to an international judicial decision in connection with a dispute before the national court, and
observing a more prevalent “osmosis” of international decisions into the domestic legal order through the
emergence of supranationality in certain universal
and regional organizations); Sarita Ordonez & David
Reily, Effect of the Jurisprudence of the International
Court of Justice on National Courts, in National
Courts, supra, at 345 (illustrating various ways in
which domestic courts have “received” the International Court of Justice decisions and advisory opin-

ions).
[FN180]
. Meinhard Hilf, The Role of National
Courts in International Trade Relations, 18 Mich. J.
Int'l L. 321, 346-47 (1997) [hereinafter Hilf, The
Role of National Courts] (observing in the EU context that “national courts tend to interpret the relevant
implementing legislation in a manner which avoids
conflicts with existing GATT law”).
[FN181]
. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology of
Transjudicial Communication,” in National Courts,
supra note 179, at 51-52.
[FN182]
. Cf. Alec Stone Sweet, The New GATT:
Dispute Resolution and the Judicialization of the
Trade Regime, in Law above Nations: Supranational
Courts and the Legalization of Politics 118, 138
(Mary L. Volcansek ed., 1997) (suggesting that
“WTO legal norms gradually embed themselves
within national legal systems, either by domestic legislative actions or judicial decisions”); Richard M.
Goodman & John M. Frost, International Economic
Agreements and the Constitution 2 (The Inst. for Int'l
Econ., Working Paper No. 00-2, 2000), available at
http://www.iie.com/publications/wp/2000/00-2.pdf
(last visited on Feb. 19, 2004) (arguing that
“international agreements, such as GATT and NAFTA, can serve as useful interpretive guidelines for the
Court where the challenged state measure restricts the
cross-border flow of goods or services”).
[FN183]

. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

[FN184]

. Id. at art. VI.

[FN185]

. Id. at amend. XIV.

[FN186]

. Id. at amends. V, XIV.

[FN187]
. Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the
Treaty on European Union, the Treaties Establishing
the European Communities and Certain Related Acts,
Oct. 2, 1997, O.J. (C 340), art. 2, § 7 (1997); Treaty
Establishing the European Community, Nov. 10,
1997, O.J. (C 340) 3, art. 12 (1997) [hereinafter EC
Treaty].
[FN188]

. EC Treaty, supra note 187, art. 230.
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[FN189]
. See Hudec, supra note 121, at 503-08
(regarding a standpoint viewing protectionism as a
“constitutional failure”).
[FN190]
. See Murray v. Schooner Charming
Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 117-18; Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of
Domestic Statutory Construction, 43 Vand. L. Rev.
1103, 1197 (1990).
[FN191]
. See, e.g., Bradford R. Clark, Federal
Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation, 144 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 1245, 1276 (1996) (arguing that the law
applied by the Supreme Court in Swift v. Tyson, 41
U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), was a “customary body of
rules” derived from jus gentium and that no court is
free to establish its own hermeneutics in departure
from it). From a congruent standpoint, Justice
O'Connor advocates that domestics courts should
“faithfully recognize the obligations imposed by international law” as seen in Murray v. The Charming
Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cronel) 64, and The Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900). See Sandra Day
O'Connor, Federalism of Free Nations, 28 N.Y.U. J.
Int'l L. & Pol. 35, 38-42 (1995). She emphasizes the
federalist ideal of healthy dialogue and mutual trust
which may be formed between domestic courts and
transnational tribunals, which might be depicted in
terms of Kant's “federalism of free nations.” Id. at 41.
See also Sandra Day O'Connor, Broadening Our Horizons: Why American Lawyers Must Learn About
Foreign Law, Fed. Law. Sept. 1998, at 20, 20-21
(highlighting the flexibility and dynamism of the
common law tradition which enables the borrowing
of new ideas from other legal systems and permits the
“civilizing fiction of constitutional law”); Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 Va.
L. Rev. 771, 775 (1997) (advising his readers
strongly to “look upon the American experience as a
special case, not as the paradigmatic case”); Roger J.
Miner, The Reception of Foreign Law in the U.S.
Federal Courts, 43 Am. J. Comp. L. 581, 581 (1995)
(observing that the U.S. federal courts tend to “duck
and run” in the face of foreign law issues despite that
they are beginning to “form a significant part of the
business of the federal courts”); Mark Tushnet, The
Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108
Yale L. J. 1225, 1228 (1999) (introducing a “more

systematic approach to the possibility of learning
from constitutional experience elsewhere”). Cf. W.
Michael Reisman, Through or Despite Governments:
Differentiated Responsibilities in Human Rights Program, 72 Iowa L. Rev. 391, 394-97 (1987)
(introducing Georges Scelle's celebrated argument for
dedoublement fonctionnel which views domestic
courts as “functional international courts”).
[FN192]
. See Debra Herz, Effects of International
Arbitral Tribunals in National Courts (II), in National
Courts, supra note 179, at 219 (concluding that
GATT panel decisions have been “influential” in the
U.S. Courts despite the lack of “formal deference”).
See also Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530
U.S. 363, 388 (2000) (rejecting the 1996 Massachusetts law barring state entities from purchasing goods
or services from companies doing business with
Burma on the ground that the state Act was
“preempted,” and its application “unconstitutional,
under the Supremacy Clause”); WTO Request for
Consultation, United States-Measure Affecting Government Procurement, WT/DS88/1 (June 26, 1997).
[FN193]

. Hawaii v. Ho, 41 Haw. 565 (1957).

[FN194]

. Id. at 565.

[FN195]

. Id. at 567-69.

[FN196]

. Id. at 569-71.

[FN197]
. Goya De Puerto Rico Inc. v. Santiago,
59 F. Supp. 2d 274, 276 (D.P.R. 1999).
[FN198]

. Id. at 276.

[FN199]

. Id. at 277.

[FN200]
. Agreement on Application of Sanitary
and Phylosanitary Measures, Annex IA, WTO Agreement, supra note 2.
[FN201]
. See Chiquita Sues EC Over Banana Regime, Bridges Wkly. Trade News Dig., Jan. 30, 2001,
available
at
http://www.ictsd.org/html/weekly/story6.30-01-01.htm
(last visited on Feb. 19, 2004).
[FN202]

. Action brought on 25 January 2001 by
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Chiquita Brands International, Inc, Chiquita Banana
Company B.V. and Chiquita Italia, S.p.A. against the
Commission of the European Communities, (Case T19/01), 2001 O.J. (C108) 23, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/archive/2001/c_1082001
0407en.html (last visited on Feb. 19, 2004).
[FN203]

. Id. at 24.

[FN204]

. See Slaughter, supra note 181, at 60-62.

[FN205]
. See Martin A. Rogoff, Interpretation of
International Agreements by Domestic Courts and
the Politics of International Treaty Relations: Reflections on Some Recent Decisions of the United States
Supreme Court, 11 Am. U. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 559,
646 (1996) (quoting Richard Falk, Evasions of Sovereignty, in Contending Sovereignties: Redefining
Political Community 336 (R.B.J. Walker & Saul H.
Mendlevitz eds., 1990)).
[FN206]
. In this regard, Frank Dawson and Ivan
Head stated that: “Just as attorneys are considered
‘officers of the court’ in a domestic setting, they also
must learn to regard themselves as agents or officers
of the international legal order, with obligations transcending national boundaries.” Dawson & Head,
supra note 177, at 312.
[FN207]
. Cf. Peter Goodrich, Legal Discourse:
Studies in Linguistics, Rhetoric and Legal Analysis 7
(1987) (arguing that “legal practice and legal language are structured in such a way as to prevent the
acquisition of such knowledge by any other than a
highly trained elite of specialists in the various domains of legal study”); Bernard S. Jackson, Semiotics
and Legal Theory 286 (1985) (observing that the
“audience, or groupe semiotique” of judicial discourse is relatively restricted).
[FN208]
. See Rogoff, supra note 205, at 674
(observing that “[n]ational judges, when they interpret international agreements, especially the typical
international agreements that come before national
courts for interpretation and application, may profitably be thought of as members of an epistemic community”).
[FN209]

. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Internation-

al Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 Eur. J. Int'l L.
503, 524-26 (1995).
[FN210]
. See Jonathan I. Charney, Third Party
Dispute Settlement and International Law, 36 Colum.
J. Transnat'l L. 65, 73 (1997); Laurence R. Helfer &
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective
Supranational Adjudication, 107 Yale L.J. 273,
323-26 (1997); Anne-Marie Slaughter, Liberal International Relations Theory and International Economic Law, 10 Am. U. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 717, 743 (1995);
Slaughter, supra note 181, at 57-59 (discussing “a
common judicial identity and methodology”); AnneMarie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 Va. J.
Int'l L. 1103, 1107 (2000) (discussing this phenomenon in the European Community).
[FN211]
. See Slaughter, supra note 209, at
524-26; J.H.H. Weiler, A Quiet Revolution: The
European Court of Justice and Its Interlocutors, 26
Comp. Pol. Stud. 510, 521-22 (1994). See also Paul
R. Dubinsky, The Essential Function of Federal
Courts: The European Union and the United States
Compared, 42 Am. J. Comp. L. 295, 296-97 (1994)
(introducing the emerging view that “the Court of
Justice together with the national courts must exercise certain essential functions in an increasingly federalized Common Market”).
[FN212]

. See Weiler, supra note 171, at 2426.

[FN213]
. See Mauro Cappelletti, Forward to the
Florence Integration Project Series, in A Political,
Legal and Economic Overview (Book 1), Methods,
Tools and Institutions (Volume 1), Integration
Through Law: European and the American Federal
Experience v. & n.1 (Mauro Cappelletti et al. eds.,
1985).
[FN214]
. See Wolf Sauter, The Economic Constitution of the European Union, 4 Colum. J. Eur. L. 27,
41 (1998). Cf. H. Lauterpacht, Private Law Sources
and Analogies of International Law viii (Archon
Books 1970) (1927) (arguing that “general principles
of law, recognized by civilised States and adopted by
customary and conventional international law as a
source of decision in international disputes, are for
the most part identical with generally recognised
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principles of private law” (emphasis added)); Raul
Emilio Vinuesa, The New Role of Equity as a Source
of International Law, in XIX Thesaurus Acroasium
of the Institute of Public International Law and International Relations of Thessaloniki “Peace Messenger
of the UN” 451, U.N. Doc. A/42/487, (1992); Pippa
Tubman, National Jurisprudence in International
Tribunals, in National Courts, supra note 179, at 451
(observing that general principles of law have played
an important role in the development of international
law).
[FN215]
. Cf. Thomas M. Franck & Gregory H.
Fox, Introduction: Transnational Judicial Synergy, in
National Courts, supra note 179, at 4-5 (observing
that an “inter-jurisdictional discourse,” by which
“monitoring and implementing functions” can be
shared by international and domestic courts, creates a
“functional synergy” equivalent to that found in an
advanced “federal system, with national and provincial courts providing mutual reinforcement of essential norms while also protecting space for varied local
experimentation and due reference to socio-cultural
sensibilities”).
[FN216]
added).

. DSU, supra note 36, art. 19.1 (emphasis

[FN217]

. Slaughter, supra note 181, at 52-54.

[FN218]
. Cf. id. at 65 (maintaining that “a process of collective deliberation over the protection of
human rights would, in effect, create a multidimensional mechanism for creating and enforcing
the human rights provisions of a hypothetical global
constitution.”); Ordonez & Reily, supra note 179, at
371 (arguing that “domestic judges need to realize
that they play an integral role in the continuing development of international law”).
[FN219]
. Cf. Hilf, The Role of National Courts,
supra note 180, at 346-47 (maintaining that a major
effort made at both national and international levels
to provide for more efficient application of GATT
law would boost the efficiency of the WTO system as
a whole and reinforce its legitimacy).
END OF DOCUMENT
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